| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: usb: bound what the driver feeds the after-DTIM queue
Frames routed to the high queue are transmitted right after DTIM beacons
only, inside the ATIM window, while they wait in the shared TX page pool.
The driver puts no limit on how many it hands over, so as long as one
station dozes, any sustained broadcast or multicast traffic outruns the
drain and empties the pool: measured on an RTL8822BU AP with a single
client in power save and ~40 frames/s of mDNS chatter, the free page
count at 0x240 goes from 1803 to 16 in about 100 seconds and stays there
for as long as the traffic lasts. From that point every other transmit
queues behind the backlog, authentication responses arrive too late for
anyone to join, and the reserved page download fails ("error beacon
valid"). The AP keeps beaconing and only a reboot recovers.
Feed the high queue through a small budget that refills below the
measured drain rate (about 3 frames per DTIM, ~15/s at dtim_period 2 on
the default 2 TU ATIM window); whatever exceeds the budget leaves on its
access category queue right away. The high queue backlog is now bounded
by the burst size under any load, so the page pool cannot run dry, at
the price that a dozing station may miss part of a broadcast storm. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: zone: fix to avoid bio split on sequential zone
In the block layer, bio_split_to_limits() splits a bio if it exceeds
any underlying queue limits:
1. queue_max_sectors: Splits bios larger than the transfer limit. This
limit is set by the device driver/DMA controller (max_hw_sectors) and
device-mapper targets. When flushing dirty pages (governed by VFS
writeback_chunk_size() and f2fs nr_pages_to_skip()), f2fs merges
contiguous pages into bios up to 512KB (1024 sectors) or more without
checking queue_max_sectors, which will be split if the device or DM
target enforces a smaller limit.
2. queue_max_segments: Splits bios exceeding scatter-gather segment
limits. f2fs allocates bios with up to 256 pages, exceeding the
128-segment limit of DM targets (dm-default-key/dm-crypt) if pages
are discontiguous.
3. chunk_sectors: Splits bios crossing chunk/zone boundaries. In f2fs,
section_size strictly matches zone_size, and block allocation never
spans across section boundaries, so bios never cross chunk_sectors.
Crucially, when bio_split_to_limits() splits a bio, bio_submit_split()
submits the tail half via submit_bio_noacct() before returning the head
half to the caller. On a sequential zoned device, this causes the tail
bio to arrive at the zone write plug before the head:
dm-3: zone 7: prepare_bio wp mismatch: bio sector 30720 offset 2048
!= wp_offset 248, len 248
The write plug rejects the out-of-order tail with BLK_STS_IOERR, causing
f2fs_stop_checkpoint() and remounting the filesystem read-only:
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725678+08:00 localhost kernel: CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 243 Comm: kworker/9:1H Not tainted 6.12.81-gb3ef518fb26d #5
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725750+08:00 localhost kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725753+08:00 localhost kernel: Workqueue: dm-3_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725756+08:00 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725758+08:00 localhost kernel: <TASK>
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725758+08:00 localhost kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725759+08:00 localhost kernel: f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1df/0x5d0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725759+08:00 localhost kernel: ? blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x4eb/0x740
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725760+08:00 localhost kernel: f2fs_cache_write_end_io+0x545/0x6e0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725761+08:00 localhost kernel: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x4eb/0x740
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725762+08:00 localhost kernel: process_one_work+0x5c6/0xde0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725764+08:00 localhost kernel: ? assign_work+0x124/0x4e0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725765+08:00 localhost kernel: worker_thread+0x403/0xb70
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725765+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __kthread_parkme+0x82/0x140
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725766+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725766+08:00 localhost kernel: kthread+0x235/0x2e0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725767+08:00 localhost kernel: ? recalc_sigpending+0x128/0x1d0
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725767+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725769+08:00 localhost kernel: ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x70
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725769+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725770+08:00 localhost kernel: ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725771+08:00 localhost kernel: </TASK>
2026-09-30T22:09:23.725771+08:00 localhost kernel: F2FS-fs (dm-0): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 3
To prevent write bios destined for sequential zones from being split:
1. In __bio_alloc(), bound npages to bdev_max_segments(bdev) for writes to
sequential zone areas.
2. In page_is_mergeable(), check queue_max_segments() and queue_max_sectors()
for sequential zone areas, so f2fs will not merge beyond the queue limits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: return -EIO for a lost inode block after cp_error
After cp_error, dirty node caches are dropped without being written.
If such an inode was never written, its NAT entry is still NEW_ADDR,
and reading its inode block returns -ENOENT.
f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() passes that -ENOENT up, and callers take it
as a hole. Since the inode block is missing, the next offset can only
advance one block, so fiemap walks block by block up to maxbytes,
about 2^30 blocks, while holding the inode lock. It took hours in a
power-off recovery test after shutdown and blocked unlink and umount
on the file.
Return -EIO instead of -ENOENT when the inode block itself is missing
after cp_error or shutdown. A missing direct or indirect node is still
reported as -ENOENT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: bound the SIT/NAT bitmaps by the checkpoint pack
sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize and nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize are used as memcpy
lengths into and out of sbi->ckpt, which is sized from cp_payload alone,
and nothing compares either length against that allocation.
sanity_check_ckpt() has checked these two fields since c77ec61ca0a4, which
added them after a crafted image overran build_sit_info(). That check ties
each length to a segment count; it never compares either against the
allocation, which is the half this adds.
Mounting over-reads in build_sit_info() and build_node_manager(), and the
first checkpoint writes the same lengths back through the same pointers,
so the over-read's contents reach the on-disk checkpoint. An unmount is
enough; the filesystem does not have to be used.
Bound both ends the way __bitmap_ptr() lays them out. The three branches
differ, so a single sum of the two lengths would still admit a small
overflow when cp_payload is non-zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Stop the target vcpu when disabling LPIs
Disabling LPIs is pretty nasty, as it directly messes with the AP list
of the affected CPU, which could be running... This has the potential to
lead to really bad behaviours, and we should not be doing that.
Take example on the way the Active state is handled and simply pause the
the vcpu so that we are sure it is in a quiescent state, and the state be
safely manipulated.
Nobody has any expectation of performance for this anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid potential reference count leak in do_garbage_collect()
In do_garbage_collect(), we have reserved reference counts on summary cache
of all segments, once gc_thread encounter freezing, we need to release all
reference counts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute
Reading the "address" sysfs attribute calls kernel_getsockname() on the
admin queue socket, which can race with the queue teardown during
connection error recovery: a reader can observe NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE set,
then block on the queue lock while nvme_tcp_free_queue() releases the
socket and clears queue->sock without holding the lock. Once the
reader acquires the lock it dereferences the NULL socket pointer.
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") had the queue liveness check inside the lock.
Commit 782373ba2766 ("nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue_lock lock
and destroy") moved it back out because the lock itself is destroyed
in nvme_tcp_free_queue(), so a reader arriving late trips
mutex_destroy().
Check the queue liveness inside the queue lock, and clear queue->sock
under the same lock. The teardown clears NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE under the
lock well before the socket is released, so a reader either sees the
bit cleared or a socket that cannot be released while it holds the
lock. To also close the lock lifetime race, the queue locks are now
owned by the controller: they are initialized with the queue array and
only destroyed when the controller is freed, which cannot happen while
a sysfs attribute read is still in progress. The queue count is
computed by the NVME_TCP_OPT_NR_QUEUES() macro from the original
connect options for both initialization and destruction, as reconnects
may shrink ctrl->queue_count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to invalidate curseg if change_curseg() fails
Our consistency stress test (fsstress + fio + atomic write workers +
"f2fs_io shutdown 1") triggers below kernel BUG:
F2FS-fs (vdd): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:3989!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:48)
RIP: 0010:f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x257a/0x38e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_write_block+0x155/0xc10
f2fs_outplace_write_data+0x192/0x340
f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xc57/0x1880
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xda9/0x15a0
f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x973/0x1f20
__f2fs_write_data_pages+0x6c4/0x1890
do_writepages+0x21e/0x560
__writeback_single_inode+0x119/0x11b0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x67d/0x17a0
wb_writeback+0x207/0x820
wb_workfn+0x128/0xc30
process_one_work+0x925/0x1600
worker_thread+0x60a/0xff0
kthread+0x35f/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x474/0x7e0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
The BUG is f2fs_bug_on(sbi, curseg->next_blkoff >= BLKS_PER_SEG(sbi))
in f2fs_allocate_data_block(), next_blkoff was 512.
The root cause is a race in between atomic write commit and shutdown
as below:
Thread A (commit atomic write) Thread B (shutdown) Thread C (writeback)
- f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write
- f2fs_commit_atomic_write
- __f2fs_commit_atomic_write
- __replace_atomic_write_block
- f2fs_replace_block
- __f2fs_replace_block
- f2fs_ioc_shutdown
- f2fs_do_shutdown
: F2FS_GOING_DOWN_METASYNC
- f2fs_sync_fs
- f2fs_write_single_data_page
: pass f2fs_cp_error() check
- f2fs_stop_checkpoint
: set CP_ERROR_FLAG
- change_curseg
- reset_curseg
: curseg->segno = new_segno
: curseg->alloc_type = SSR
: curseg->next_blkoff = __next_free_blkoff()
which is BLKS_PER_SEG if there is no free
slot in new_segno
- f2fs_get_sum_cache
: return -EIO due to f2fs_cp_error()
: return error w/o restoring curseg
: goto out_unlock, skip restoring
old segno, blkoff and alloc_type
- f2fs_do_write_data_page
- f2fs_outplace_write_data
- do_write_block
- f2fs_allocate_data_block
: curseg->segno is valid
: f2fs_bug_on(next_blkoff >=
BLKS_PER_SEG)
Since commit 86f33603f8c5 ("f2fs: handle errors of
f2fs_get_meta_page_nofail"), change_curseg() can fail after the curseg
has already been switched to the new segment, then the curseg is left
in an inconsistent state: it points to a segment which may have no
free slot, its summary block is zeroed, and the caller can not restore
it. Subsequent block allocation on the curseg will trigger the BUG.
Moreover, the writeback thread dies with curseg_lock, curseg_mutex and
sentry_lock held, so the commit, shutdown and other I/O threads hang
in D state.
Since change_curseg() only fails once CP_ERROR_FLAG is set, no
checkpoint will be committed afterward, let's invalidate the curseg via
reset_curseg_fields() on failure, as new_curseg() does for -ENOSPC,
then f2fs_allocate_data_block() will fail with -ENOSPC on the curseg
instead of triggering BUG, and do_write_block() can handle the error
since CP_ERROR_FLA
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: release a removed xattr node in roll-forward recovery
When xattrs shrink enough to fit in the inline xattr area,
write_all_xattrs() truncates the xattr node and clears i_xattr_nid. If
the file is then fsynced without a checkpoint, only the inode block is
written, with i_xattr_nid of 0.
Roll-forward recovery starts from the checkpointed inode, whose
i_xattr_nid still points to the old xattr node.
f2fs_recover_inline_xattr() copies only the inline xattr area, and
f2fs_update_inode() writes the old i_xattr_nid back. So the inode keeps
the stale xattr node:
- The node block is never released, and fsck reports "nonzero bytes in
xattr space after end of list".
- If the inline xattr list ends exactly at the end of the inline area,
its terminator is read from the stale node, and the removed xattrs
come back after recovery.
When the fsynced inode has no xattr node but the checkpointed one has,
release the old xattr node as truncate_node() does: check its block
address, invalidate the block and drop its node cache, which may still
be dirty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/iova_bitmap: Ensure that iova_bitmap_set() handles the full IOVA
Generally userspace is going to step the dirty bitmap through the IOVA
space. However if the bitmap ends in the middle of a large PTE this is
problematic. The first step will clear the dirty bit and report dirty to
the end of its bitmap while the second step will see the clear'd dirty and
report clean for the start of the bitmap. If it happens this ends up
losing dirties.
Further this function is missing bounds checking so if this does happen
ther is a good chance it will write memory beyond what the userspace was
expecting.
Return an error code if this illegal condition happens. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
assoc_array: don't chain a new shortcut onto an existing one
When a full node's leaves and the new key all share the node's segment,
assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node() replaces the node with a
shortcut to a pair of new nodes. If the node is itself the target of a
shortcut, the new shortcut is installed as that shortcut's next node,
and a shortcut leading to a shortcut is something nothing expects:
assoc_array_walk() indexes the second one as a node, and
assoc_array_apply_edit() hits the BUG_ON() in the loop that adjusts
nr_leaves_on_branch, on that same insertion.
Deletion gets a node there. When the subtree below a shortcut shrinks
enough, assoc_array_delete() collapses it into one node below the
shortcut, and the leaves it collects can all share that node's segment.
The next key that shares it too takes this path. Eighteen insertions
and a deletion are enough: sixteen keys that agree on bits 0-11, one
that leaves them at bit 8 and is deleted again, and one more that agrees
with the sixteen.
Have the new shortcut replace the one in front of the node as well.
assoc_array_insert_shortcut() gives it that shortcut's back pointer and
parent slot, so the caller installs it where that one was, and excises
the old shortcut along with the node, which takes a second entry in
excised_meta[]. The new shortcut's index key comes from the new key up
to the new skip level, so it covers what the old one did.
Found by a userspace test doing random insertions and deletions on keys
that share long prefixes; a targeted case builds a shortcut, deletes
down to the collapse and inserts one more key. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
assoc_array: keep gc's cleanup out of the live tree on allocation failure
assoc_array_gc() builds a copy of the tree. Where the copy reaches a
shortcut, it allocates the copy of the shortcut with kmalloc_flex(),
fills it with memcpy(), links it into the new tree, and only then
allocates the copy of the node after it. The memcpy() leaves the new
shortcut's next_node pointing at the old tree's node, so if that second
allocation fails, the cleanup, assoc_array_destroy_subtree() on the new
tree, follows the new shortcut into the old tree, and the BUG_ON() on
the old node's back pointer fires.
Allocate the node first, and the shortcut once the node exists, freeing
the node again if the shortcut cannot be allocated. A copied shortcut
is then only linked into the new tree when the copy of its node is there
to follow it. Nothing else changes: with no allocation failing, the
trees gc builds are the same as before.
Found by a userspace test that makes each allocation of each operation
fail in turn. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in XiangLi1999 Diffusion-LM up to 759889d58ef38e2eed41a8c34db8032e072826f4. This issue affects the function main of the file improved-diffusion/scripts/text_sample.py. Such manipulation of the argument out_dir leads to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product implements a rolling release for ongoing delivery, which means version information for affected or updated releases is unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A weakness has been identified in XiangLi1999 Diffusion-LM up to 759889d58ef38e2eed41a8c34db8032e072826f4. This vulnerability affects the function os.system of the file improved-diffusion/scripts/infill.py. This manipulation of the argument notes causes os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.
cow_spdy:inflate/2 in cowlib passes peer-supplied compressed bytes directly to zlib:inflate/2 with no output size bound. The SPDY header compression dictionary (?ZDICT) is public, and zlib compresses long runs of repeated bytes at roughly 1024:1, so a few kilobytes of SPDY frame payload can decompress to gigabytes on the BEAM heap, OOM-killing the node. A single unauthenticated SPDY frame is sufficient to trigger the condition. The parsers for syn_stream, syn_reply, and headers frame types are all affected via cow_spdy:parse_headers/2.
This issue affects cowlib: from 0.1.0 before 2.16.1. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowboy allows denial of service via unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing.
cowboy_req:read_part/3 in src/cowboy_req.erl accumulates incoming request bytes into a Buffer binary with no upper-bound check. When cow_multipart:parse_headers/2 returns more or {more, Buffer2}, the function reads up to Length bytes (default 64 KB) from the request body and recurses with the enlarged buffer. There is no equivalent of the byte_size(Acc) > Length guard present in the sibling function read_part_body/4. An unauthenticated attacker can send a multipart/form-data request whose body never yields a complete header section — for example, a body that never contains the advertised boundary delimiter, or one whose header lines never contain \r\n\r\n — and force the server process to accumulate memory linearly with the bytes the protocol layer is willing to deliver. A handful of concurrent such uploads is sufficient to exhaust BEAM memory.
The function has had two names. From 0.10.0 to 2.0.0-pre.3 it is cowboy_req:part/3, reached through cowboy_req:part/1 and cowboy_req:part/2. From 2.0.0-pre.4 it is cowboy_req:read_part/3, reached through cowboy_req:read_part/1 and cowboy_req:read_part/2. Both have the same buffer loop.
This issue affects cowboy: from 0.10.0 before 2.15.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups
TCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved
use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader
that retained its old address has finished.
After a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and
__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple
check. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the
address is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can
acquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node
is unhashed.
A PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the
crash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.
A lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired
the reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new
object. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.
The resulting crash was:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
...
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
...
RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280
...
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000
...
CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70
ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0
ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0
? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0
napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170
virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600
__napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0
net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0
handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0
__irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0
common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90
</IRQ>
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
After taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in
both IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple
no longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.
Lookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being
replaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of
returning the old one.
Request sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero
refcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,
when SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after
setting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths
with reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly. |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.19840 privilege escalation from project administrator to system administrator was possible via group merging |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3, 2026.2.4 code execution was possible in untrusted projects via the Code Provenance plugin |
| In JetBrains Rider before 2026.3 code execution was possible via MSBuild configuration files in parent directories |