| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/proc/task_mmu: pin mm_users in do_pagemap_scan()
The PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl takes mmap_read_lock() on an mm obtained from
/proc/<pid>/pagemap without holding a reference to mm_users.
proc_mem_open() deliberately grabs only mm_count, so a consumer that
touches the address space has to call mmget_not_zero() first. Every other
consumer in this file does -- m_start(), do_procmap_query(),
show_smaps_rollup() and pagemap_read() -- but do_pagemap_scan() does not.
Without that reference the target can reach exit_mmap() concurrently, and
exit_mmap() calls unmap_vmas() while holding mmap_lock only for reading,
which does not exclude the scanner. For ordinary VMAs this is harmless,
as free_pgtables() and remove_vma() run afterwards under mmap_write_lock.
A shared hugetlb VMA is different: __hugetlb_zap_end() frees the VMA's
hugetlb_vma_lock inside the read-locked phase.
walk_hugetlb_range() can therefore load vma->vm_private_data, have the
lock freed underneath it, and then down_read() a freed rw_semaphore. The
load happens before the freeing side clears the pointer, so this is a
use-after-free and not a NULL dereference. Any unprivileged user can
reach it with no huge pages configured, as hugetlb_reserve_pages()
allocates the lock before the VM_NORESERVE early return.
Pin mm_users across the scan, the way the other consumers do. mmput()
from the exiting task can then no longer reach exit_mmap() while a walk is
in progress.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded & undesirable test for !mm] |
| Mixed-case HTTPS and FTPS URLs can expose data in plaintext.
The HTTP and FTP stream wrappers recognise URL schemes case-insensitively, but enable TLS only when the scheme contains a lowercase "s" at a fixed position. A URL such as HTTPS:// or FTPS:// passed to file_get_contents(), fopen() or other stream functions, or received as an HTTP redirect target, is therefore handled over unencrypted HTTP or FTP. An attacker able to observe the network traffic can read data the application expected TLS to protect, including credentials, request bodies and transferred files.
This issue affects PHP versions before 8.2.36, 8.3.* before 8.3.37, 8.4.* before 8.4.28 and 8.5.* before 8.5.13. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filelock: keep superblock active through delegation wait
A caller may drop its path after try_break_deleg() returns a delegated
inode but before break_deleg_wait() finishes. The extra inode reference
held in struct delegated_inode does not keep the superblock active.
After a lazy unmount, closing the delegation holder can release the last
mount reference and shut down the superblock while another task waits for
the delegation break. The waiter's final iput() can then enter the
filesystem's eviction code after its superblock-private state was freed.
This has been observed as a KASAN use-after-free in shmem_evict_inode().
When try_break_deleg() saves a delegated inode, take an active reference
to its superblock while the caller still pins the mount. Keep that
reference through break_deleg_wait() and the final iput(), then release
it with deactivate_super(). This protects every caller of the helpers,
including the mknod, mkdir, symlink and rmdir paths that drop their path
before waiting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: Prevent FIFO work after removal
The LCD controller IRQ schedules sinfo->task to recover from a FIFO
underflow. Probe currently requests the IRQ before initializing the
work, so an early interrupt can schedule an uninitialized work item.
The probe error path and remove path cancel the work before freeing the
IRQ. A FIFO-underflow interrupt can schedule the work again after that
cancellation. framebuffer_release() may then free sinfo while the work
is still pending.
KASAN reported a use-after-free in atmel_lcdfb_task() when an underflow
interrupt occurred during removal. With the IRQ freed before the work
was cancelled, the same test completed without a kernel diagnostic.
Initialize the work before requesting the IRQ. In both cleanup paths,
free the IRQ before cancelling the work so that it cannot be scheduled
again after cancellation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Fix TOCTOU race between GROUP_REGISTERED check and erase
panthor_group_destroy() checks the GROUP_REGISTERED mark and then calls
xa_erase() without holding the xarray lock across both. If the handle is
destroyed by another thread in between, and a concurrent GROUP_CREATE
reuses the freed ID, the first destroy erases and releases the new,
still-initializing group, leading to a use-after-free in
panthor_group_create().
Do the mark check and erase atomically under xa_lock(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_vhci: Pin module for debugfs file operations
An open debugfs file retains its file_operations pointer in the
debugfs proxy state. However, force_suspend_fops, force_wakeup_fops,
aosp_capable_fops, and force_devcoredump_fops have no .owner set to
THIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get()
which succeeds without taking a reference to the hci_vhci module.
When userspace opens any of these debugfs files and later closes
the /dev/vhci file descriptor (triggering vhci_release() and
debugfs file removal), the open debugfs file descriptor remains valid
in userspace. Because the module refcount was not incremented,
the hci_vhci module can be unloaded via delete_module (rmmod hci_vhci).
When the userspace process subsequently closes the debugfs file
descriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already unmapped
file_operations structure, resulting in a kernel page fault / oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff846f18b
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0x8e/0x140
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fput+0x39f/0xa60
fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200
__x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: hci_vhci(E)]
The issue was discovered via manual code audit of
drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c and verified on a Linux 7.3-rc6 test VM
with CONFIG_BT_VHCI=m by keeping a debugfs file open across controller
teardown and module unload.
Set .owner = THIS_MODULE on all four file_operations structures so that
debugfs pins the module until all file descriptors are closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: ps: fix snd_acp63_remove() teardown ordering
The ACP IRQ handlers dereference the SoundWire, SoundWire DMA, and PDM
child platform devices, but snd_acp63_remove() unregisters them while
the interrupt is still held by devres, which frees it only after remove
returns. An interrupt in this window is a use-after-free.
Mask the ACP interrupt sources and call devm_free_irq() before the
first child device is unregistered. The masking goes through the new
acp_hw_ops->disable_interrupts callback, keeping the remove path
platform-agnostic. The interrupt line is shared, and acp_hw_deinit()
clears the sources only after the children are gone, which would
leave the line raised with no handler left to ack it. The window
predates the tagged refactor, which only reshaped the dereferences.
devm_free_irq() waits for in-flight handlers, but not for work the
hardirq has already queued: acp63_irq_handler() schedules
amd_sdw_irq_thread on the SoundWire manager. Draining that work in
the manager's remove path is a soundwire-side change and follows
separately.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcmtest: handle multiple wraps in random capture fill
The random capture helpers assume that the data generated for one timer
tick wraps the DMA ring at most once. However, b_rw describes 200 ms of
audio because the timer runs at 5 Hz, so it can be several times larger
than a small ring.
For 48 kHz, S16_LE, four-channel capture with a 512-frame buffer, the DMA
ring is 4096 bytes while one tick generates 76800 bytes. After filling the
4096-byte tail, the existing code issues a second 72704-byte write from the
ring base, writing 68608 bytes beyond the ring. Both interleaved and
non-interleaved capture are affected.
KASAN reports the first write into the adjacent free page as a
use-after-free in the random-byte generator. The underlying defect is an
out-of-bounds write from the live DMA ring, not a stale DMA allocation.
Split each random write repeatedly at the interleaved ring or per-channel
block boundary. Keep the hardware-pointer update exactly once after the
complete logical write.
The issue reproduced on three of three clean boots. With this change, the
same vulnerable geometry completed six times without a sanitizer finding.
Boundary, pattern-fill, no-timer, open/close, and module-reload controls
also completed normally.
snd-pcmtest is a test driver, and selecting random fill requires an
administrator-controlled module parameter. The written values come from the
kernel random generator; no privilege escalation or attacker-controlled
write primitive was demonstrated. |
| Partially overwritten session files can lead to remote code execution.
The files session save handler, which is the default, writes updated session data into the existing session file without first clearing it. If a write is interrupted, the file can contain the beginning of the new session followed by the end of the old one, and bytes of an ordinary string can later be unserialized as objects. An attacker who can influence the session data, for example through session upload progress, and interrupt a write at a suitable point may inject objects, which can lead to code execution when the application contains a suitable gadget chain. Session data can also be corrupted.
This issue affects PHP versions before 8.2.36, 8.3.* before 8.3.37, 8.4.* before 8.4.28 and 8.5.* before 8.5.13. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: emux: Fix UAF of soundfont zones at note-on
snd_emux_note_on() looks up the matching zones via
snd_soundfont_search_zone(), which takes sflist->lock only during the
lookup and returns the raw zone pointers after releasing it. The
caller then stores them in vp->zone without any protection.
Meanwhile, a concurrent SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES ioctl may
unlink and free those zones in snd_soundfont_remove_unlocked(); this
leads to a use-after-free in snd_emux_note_on(), and later at
accessing the cached vp->zone, e.g. in snd_emux_send_effect().
Fix it by holding sflist->lock in snd_emux_note_on() over the whole
zone lookup and voice setup, and let snd_soundfont_search_zone()
require the caller to hold the lock, instead.
snd_soundfont_lock_preset() takes sflist->lock for setting
presets_locked, so the removal path now syncs with the note-on finish. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust: configfs: fix data offset calculation for subsystem callbacks
`get_group_data()` chooses between `Group::<Parent>::container_of()` and
`Subsystem::<Parent>::container_of()` based on whether `this` represents
the root group of a configfs subsystem. It detects this by checking
`(*this).cg_subsys.is_null()`, but `link_group()` in `fs/configfs/dir.c`
unconditionally sets `cg_subsys` for every `config_group` attached anywhere
in a registered subsystem, including the subsystem's own `su_group`. The
only `config_group` with a NULL `cg_subsys` is the configfs root, on which
userspace cannot trigger callbacks. The check is therefore always false at
runtime, and the `Subsystem` branch is dead. Subsystem-level callbacks
reach the `Group` branch and may read `data` at the wrong offset.
Thus change the `is_root` check to correctly identify whether a group is a
root group by comparing `this` to `subsys.su_group`.
[ Andreas: Fix clippy warning on 1.85.0 by moving safety comment. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust: bug: pass TAINT_WARN to warn_slowpath_fmt() on UML
On UML, `warn_flags!` calls `warn_slowpath_fmt()` directly. Its third
argument is a taint number, but `warn_on!` passes its bug flags there.
As a result, `add_taint()` gets 2304 instead of 9 (`TAINT_WARN`). The
warning is not recorded: `/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` stays 0 after
`warn_on!` fires, where it should be 512. It also causes an
out-of-bounds write in `add_taint()`.
Pass `TAINT_WARN` directly, as C does on UML. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: finish fault cleanup before dropping the fault lock
On a retried fault, a fatal signal interrupting the folio lock wait
makes lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap() drop the fault lock without pinning
the file. However, filemap_fault() may still need to release
mapping->invalidate_lock. A concurrent munmap() can release the last
file reference and free the mapping before that unlock.
Defer dropping the fault lock to filemap_fault()'s retry cleanup, after
releasing invalidate_lock. If the fault lock was already dropped for
I/O, release the existing file reference instead. Keep the fault lock
held for FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT as before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: don't lose a folio lock wakeup to a signal
An exclusive waiter in folio_wait_bit_common() can leave the wait loop
because of a fatal signal, then be woken by folio_unlock() before
finish_wait(). If the waker did not hand over the lock, the waiter returns
-EINTR without trying to acquire it.
folio_wake_bit() stops after waking the first exclusive waiter, so this
loses the wakeup and can leave other waiters asleep indefinitely on an
unlocked folio.
After finish_wait(), let a waiter woken without a lock handoff try once
more to acquire the lock. If successful, return success so the caller's
eventual unlock wakes the next waiter. Otherwise, the current lock owner
will do so.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: clarify and simplify comment + description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mglru: don't use stack pointers when walking PUD and PMD tables
MGLRU passes stack copies of page-table entries in walk_pud_range() and
walk_pmd_range() when walking to the next level. These copies can become
stale when khugepaged or MADV_DONTNEED (CONFIG_PT_RECLAIM) removes a PTE
table concurrently.
This pattern dates back to commit bd74fdaea146 ("mm: multi-gen LRU:
support page table walks"). Likely, earlier locking masked the latent
bug. Later changes exposed it: commit 1d65b771bc08 ("mm/khugepaged:
retract_page_tables() without mmap or vma lock") allowed concurrent
retraction, and commit cf4a65539c13 ("memcg-v1: no need for memcg locking
for MGLRU") dropped the walker's outer RCU protection.
The fix is simple, so just fix the original commit so we don't have to
speculate. To fix it, pass the actual PMD/PUD pointers. This restores the
RCU-protected lookup and validation against the live PMD. Note that the PUD
handling is required as well to handle folded page tables correctly in all
cases.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: handle walk_pud_range() as well, clarify+simplify description,
adjust Fixes: ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: fix truncate loop after boundary swapin failure
If swapping in a large entry at the new EOF fails, shmem_undo_range()
leaves the entry in place. Its final scan skips the entry, then restarts
from the same start index and finds it again. Truncation can loop forever
while holding i_rwsem.
Advance start past the skipped entry so that a restarted scan can finish,
as we already do for folios that cannot be split.
Note that this does not fix the missing zeroing when boundary swapin fails,
it merely prevents the endless loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: preserve allocation errors when swapping in large entries
shmem_swapin_folio() adjusts swap to the requested slot within a large
swap entry before allocating a folio. If allocation or charging fails,
the error path compares this adjusted value with the original entry
still stored in the XArray in shmem_confirm_swap().
Unless the index is at the start of the entry, this turns -ENOMEM into
-EEXIST even though nothing changed.
The caller retries -EEXIST, so persistent allocation failures can leave
the task spinning instead of returning the error.
Restore swap to index_entry on allocation failure so the existing error
path checks the original entry. This preserves the allocation error if
the entry is unchanged and still retries if it changed concurrently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: stop retrying folios that cannot be split
A fault or collapse can insert a large folio crossing EOF after
shmem_undo_range() has handled the boundary folios. If splitting that
folio fails, truncate_inode_partial_folio() retains it when it is dirty.
The final scan then repeatedly finds it because it restarts from an
unchanged start.
Truncation keeps the inode lock and ignores fatal signals while looping.
A concurrent unlink() can then block other directory operations while
holding the directory lock and waiting for the file's lock.
Advance start past the retained folio, whose truncated part has already
been zeroed. Do not move start backwards if the failed split has shrunk
the folio.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: split fixes, simplify descriptions, adjust comments ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1c: drop oversized RX frames instead of panicking
atl1c sizes its receive buffers from the netdev MTU plus a fixed set of L2
overheads, which comes to 1522 bytes at the default MTU. A link partner
that sends a longer frame - in practice a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe,
whose RouterOS side defaults to l2mtu 1600 while the host stays at MTU 1500
- makes the length reported by the RX return descriptor exceed what the
hardware wrote, and skb_put() then either includes bytes that were never
received or trips skb_over_panic and takes the host down.
Compare the descriptor length against buffer_info->length, the length the
hardware was given, rather than against skb_tailroom(): the skb carries 64
bytes of slack for the DMA erratum, so tailroom is larger than the DMA
buffer and a frame in between would pass the check and still be delivered
with a tail the device never wrote. The same test rejects frames shorter
than ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN; before this change a reported length below
ETH_FCS_LEN underflowed in skb_put().
The frame is dropped with kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG) so
drop_monitor and the kfree_skb tracepoint see it, and counted through
dev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(), which survives atl1c_get_stats()
overwriting the hardware counters on every read. It also counts as work:
atl1c_clean_rfd() has already recycled the RFD, and the refill at the end
of the poll only runs when work_done is non-zero, so sustained oversized
traffic would otherwise drain the ring and stop RX.
Tested on a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe (4x AR8151) in a Proxmox VE host,
with atl1c built from a DKMS tree carrying this change: the l2mtu-1600
traffic that panics the stock driver is dropped and counted with the patch
applied, and received normally once the host MTU is raised to match.
This complements commit 36c2009d90f2 ("net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on
out-of-range tpd_cons read"), which fixed the TX side of the same
"host dies while the card resets" problem. |