| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces
kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page
tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all
address spaces. With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one
address space and appear untracked through the other.
Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space.
This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active
address space. In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from
marking an upper-level shadow page unsync and eventually triggering the
BUG in pte_list_remove().
[invert direction of the conditional. - Paolo] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount
The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from
cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of
tasks on the dying_tasks list.
The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of
dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however,
it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is
possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()).
The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free()
are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0.
The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations
when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos.
The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count
dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is
already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used
after free.)
As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task
on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting
to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd.
Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any
iteration.
The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage
count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks
on the dying_list.
Rough illustration of the possible race
R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader)
--------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
L exits, signal->live > 0
cgroup_task_dead(L)
css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks
list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks)
css_task_iter_next()
take css_set_lock
css_task_iter_advance()
leader && signal->live != 0
=> it->task_pos = &L->cg_list
release css_set_lock
T exits
--signal->live == 0
cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock
release_task(T)
cgroup_task_release(T)
release_task(L) // zap_leader
cgroup_task_release(L)
put_task_struct_rcu_user(L)
...RCU...
put_task_struct(L)
L->usage = 0
/* L still on dying_tasks */
...RCU...
__put_task_struct(L)
css_task_iter_next() // another iteration
take css_set_lock
it->task_pos = &L->cg_list
get_task_struct(L)
=> addition on 0
drop css_set_lock
cgroup_task_free(L)
css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late
free_task(L)
cgroup_procs_show()
task_pid_vnr(L) |
| SimpleChat is a secure AI conversation application with personal and group workspaces for document-grounded interactions. In versions 0.261.003 and 0.261.027, an authorization ordering flaw in POST /api/user/plugins allows an authenticated low-privileged user to omit the top-level MCP type so that _reject_non_admin_mcp_stdio skips inspection before the type is restored from metadata. The stored personal action can then reach McpPluginFactory.create_connector, and MCPStdioPlugin.connect starts the attacker-selected operating-system process under the application service identity when the action tool is invoked. Exploitation requires personal plugins to be enabled and governance to permit MCP actions, and it can expose or modify secrets and data available to the service or disrupt the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.261.031. |
| SimpleChat is a secure AI conversation application with personal and group workspaces for document-grounded interactions. Prior to 0.261.029, POST /api/group_documents/upload stores an attacker-controlled group document filename that group_workspaces.html later interpolates into inline Share event handlers. The escapeGroupHtml function leaves apostrophes unchanged, while escapeHtml produces an HTML entity that the browser decodes before JavaScript evaluation, so either path permits the filename to terminate the handler string. An authenticated group Owner, Admin, or DocumentManager can persist script that executes in the SimpleChat origin when another group member clicks Share, allowing access to victim-visible data and actions with the victim session. This issue is fixed in version 0.261.029. |
| Dell Container Storage Modules, versions prior to 1.18.0, contain(s) an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure. |
| Dell Container Storage Modules, versions prior to 1.18.0, contain(s) an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure. |
| Payload is a free and open source headless content management system. Payload versions from 3.0.0 before 3.90.0 and canary versions from 4.0.0-canary.0 before 4.0.0-canary.34 use a lower-than-recommended PBKDF2 work factor for password hashing, reducing the computational effort required to test recovered password hashes. This issue is fixed in versions 3.90.0 and 4.0.0-canary.34. |
| An issue in Bludit CMS 3.22.0 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the /admin/ajax/clippy and /admin/ajax/save-as-draft endpoints |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix NULL sched deref in kfunc sub-sched error paths
When the root scheduler has sub-scheds attached, the COMPAT kfunc
wrappers scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() and scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() refuse
the call and report to @p's scheduler:
scx_error(scx_task_sched(p), "... must be used");
The wrappers are reachable with tasks that have no scheduler.
scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() is in the select_cpu kfunc group, which
scx_kfunc_context_filter() opens to BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL programs;
scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() is in the enqueue_dispatch group, which
ops.enqueue() and ops.dispatch() may call with any KF_RCU task -- the
group has no kf_tasks validation, and scx_dsq_insert_preamble() checks
task ownership with scx_task_on_sched() precisely because @p may be an
arbitrary task.
scx_task_sched(p) is p->scx.sched, which is NULL for tasks past
sched_ext_dead() -- which clears it via scx_disable_and_exit_task() on
exit -- and for idle tasks, which the enable paths skip as they are
never scheduled through SCX. It is also an rcu_dereference_protected()
that expects @p's pi_lock or rq lock, which neither wrapper holds.
Passing NULL to scx_error() reaches scx_vexit(), which dereferences
sch->exit_info, oopsing the kernel.
One concrete trigger exercised while developing the fix: a
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program calling the select_cpu_and wrapper on an
exited-but-not-reaped task while a sub-scheduler was attached (its pid
stays findable while the zombie is unreaped; faulting instruction is
the scx_vexit() prologue "mov r15,[rdi+0x398]" with RDI=NULL and 0x398
the offset of sch->exit_info):
sched_ext: BPF scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled
sched_ext: BPF sub-scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled
sched_ext: Unassociated program run_select_cpu_ (id 76)
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000398
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 8201 Comm: kfunc_test_runn Tainted: G W
RIP: 0010:scx_vexit+0x25/0xa0
Code: ... <4c> 8b bf 98 03 00 00 ...
CR2: 0000000000000398
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__scx_exit+0x4f/0x70
scx_bpf_select_cpu_and+0xab/0xb0
bpf_prog_430ed61a7b66e03a_run_select_cpu_and+0x9c/0xe7
? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40
bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x130/0x2f0
__sys_bpf+0x930/0x10d0
? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40
__x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0x460
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Read @p's scheduler under RCU instead, which the wrappers can do from
their guard(rcu)(): fault it when it can be determined, and when it
can't be determined -- @p is a task past sched_ext_dead() or an idle
task -- there is nothing obviously wrong to report, so just refuse the
call as before without faulting any scheduler.
These COMPAT wrappers are scheduled for eventual removal once the
deprecation grace period elapses, but until then -- and regardless of
their removal timeline -- they must not oops the kernel on a task they
are handed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shrinker: fix bogus set_shrinker_bit() with cgroup.memory=nokmem
With cgroup.memory=nokmem, shrinker_memcg_alloc() bails out early and
never allocates an id, so shrinker->id keeps the 0 it got from the
kzalloc() in shrinker_alloc(). __list_lru_init() then copies that 0 into
lru->shrinker_id, where it looks like a valid bit index.
Nothing calls expand_shrinker_info() on nokmem either, so shrinker_nr_max
stays 0 and every memcg ends up with an empty map (map_nr_max == 0).
deferred_split_folio() hands a real memcg to __list_lru_add() regardless
of whether the lru is memcg aware, so the first THP queued in a cgroup
does set_shrinker_bit(memcg, nid, 0) and trips the bounds check:
WARNING: mm/shrinker.c:212 at set_shrinker_bit+0x7d/0x90, CPU#126
Call Trace:
<TASK>
deferred_split_folio+0x18c/0x220
map_anon_folio_pmd_nopf+0xdd/0x130
map_anon_folio_pmd_pf+0x14/0xb0
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x1a1/0x620
__handle_mm_fault+0xea9/0x10d0
handle_mm_fault+0xe5/0x320
do_user_addr_fault+0x1cc/0x870
exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0
asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
</TASK>
Harmless, the WARN_ON_ONCE() is what keeps the out of bounds unit[] read
from happening, but the id should not look valid in the first place.
Clear it before returning.
Two other spots could paper over this: drop the id in __list_lru_init()
when nokmem turns memcg_aware off, or make deferred_split_folio() pass
NULL like list_lru_add_obj() does. Both leave shrinker->id lying around
for the next caller, so fix it where the id is handed out. |
| Payload is a free and open source headless content management system. In versions before 3.88.0 and canary versions before 4.0.0-canary.27, an untrusted user who can query a readable collection, control its sorting, and select a protected field as the sort parameter can infer limited information about field values the user cannot read. This issue is fixed in versions 3.88.0 and 4.0.0-canary.27. |
| Dell Container Storage Modules, versions prior to 1.18.0, contain(s) a Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in the csi-powerflex; csi-powermax; csi-powerstore. An unauthenticated attacker with adjacent network access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure. |
| External Secrets Operator reads information from a third-party service and automatically injects the values as Kubernetes Secrets. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 1.3.2, a bug in the `webhook` generator initialization order incorrectly cleared the label-enforcement flag (`EnforceLabels`) after it was set, resulting in the provider-side check for `external-secrets.io/type=webhook` being skipped (and the operation to succeed while it should have failed with `secret does not contain needed label 'external-secrets.io/type: webhook'. Update secret label to use it with webhook`. Version 1.3.2 contains a patch. |
| Payload is a free and open source headless content management system. In versions from 3.0.0 before 3.88.0 and canary versions before 4.0.0-canary.27, an untrusted user who can query readable collections through dynamic filters or joins can submit a request that causes SQL injection in the SQLite and Postgres adapters. This issue is fixed in versions 3.88.0 and 4.0.0-canary.27. |
| MCP TypeScript SDK is the official TypeScript SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. Starting in version 1.12.0 and prior to versions 1.31.0 and 2.2.0, the SDK's OAuth client support let the MCP server a client connected to decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Stored and pre-provisioned credentials were not bound to the authorization server they belong to. A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server in its protected resource metadata. Without any user interaction, the client would send that server the `refresh_token` and `client_secret` stored from an earlier sign-in (1.x), or the configured `client_secret` or signed assertion of a bundled non-interactive provider (1.x and 2.x). Only those applications that use the SDK as an MCP client over HTTP with an `authProvider`: your own `OAuthClientProvider`, or the bundled `ClientCredentialsProvider`, `PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider` or (2.x) `CrossAppAccessProvider` and that may connect to an MCP server the owners does not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server are affected. `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.31.0 (1.x) and `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.2.0 (2.x) patch the issue. A workaround for those who cannot upgrade is available. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept `expectedIssuer`. On 1.x, the only workaround is to connect OAuth-enabled clients only to MCP servers you trust. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs()
In move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(), the while (src_size > 0) loop condition is
insufficient. It allows iteration to continue even if the remaining
src_size is too small to contain a complete smb2_ea_info structure.
Consequently, reads of ea_name_length and ea_value_length can occur
out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring src_size >= sizeof(*src) before attempting to read
any structure fields. Additionally, reject any next_entry_offset that is
smaller than sizeof(*src) or that would advance the pointer beyond the
available buffer.
Note that for calls where the server returns a malformed EA list, the
error returned to userspace changes from -ENODATA (getxattr) or
-ERANGE (listxattr) to -EIO. This correctly signals a server protocol
error rather than misleadingly indicating "attribute not present" or
"output buffer too small". |
| In wacom_hid_set_device_mode of wacom_sys.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to physical escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: serialize state GC with device state flush
The deferred-device pass in xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds states under
xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock, but drops the lock before calling
xfrm_dev_state_free() because the driver callback may sleep. The device
GC list does not hold an xfrm_state reference, so the state GC worker can
destroy the same state concurrently.
The race can proceed as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
find x on the device GC list
drop xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock
read x->xso.dev
xfrm_state_gc_destroy(x)
xfrm_dev_state_free(x)
xfrm_state_free(x)
continue xfrm_dev_state_free(x)
Both paths can invoke the driver callback and drop the device reference.
CPU 0 can also access the xfrm_state after CPU 1 has freed it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bbaa960 by task poc/102
Call Trace:
xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0
xfrm_dev_state_flush+0x353/0x400
xfrm_dev_event+0x26d/0x3a0
notifier_call_chain+0xc0/0x280
__dev_notify_flags+0x169/0x250
netif_change_flags+0xe7/0x160
dev_change_flags+0x96/0x220
devinet_ioctl+0x7f4/0x1880
Allocated by task 87:
xfrm_state_alloc+0x1e/0x5c0
xfrm_add_sa+0xe7f/0x5820
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x4f3/0x940
Freed by task 57:
kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0
xfrm_state_gc_task+0x4a8/0x650
process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070
Serialize xfrm_state destruction against the deferred-device pass with a
mutex. Keep xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock limited to list operations and retain
the existing callback and device-reference release ordering. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: release tail references on DELACTION failure
A batched RTM_DELACTION request takes a temporary reference on each
action before attempting any deletion. tcf_action_delete() clears
each processed slot and drops its temporary reference before attempting
the deletion. If deletion fails, tca_action_gd() calls
tcf_action_put_many() to release the remaining references, but its
tcf_act_for_each_action() iterator stops at the first NULL slot.
When a batch stops at an action bound to a filter, this leaks a
reference on each subsequent action. A later delete of an unbound
action can then return success without removing it from the IDR.
Walk the full array in tcf_action_put_many() and skip NULL slots to
release the references held on the unprocessed actions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: psp: avoid conflicts with skb->decrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb()
PSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb->decrypted and
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb().
Make PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either
of these. As other users of skb->decrypted come along, they can be added
to sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for
similar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still
broken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run
on a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state.
Include all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS
is the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is
intentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is
best to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until
someone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs. |
