| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Server-side memory exhaustion in Apache MINA SSHD 1.0.0 to 2.19.0 and 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5, component sshd-sftp, in the SFTP v6 check-file-name/check-file-handle extension. Apache MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH.
Using a very small "block size" (for instance 256, which is the minimum) on a huge file generates many (file size / block size) hashes. The resulting SFTP reply message was accumulated fully in memory server-side, which could, with a suitably large (possibly sparse) file exhaust the server-side memory, taking down the server.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue by imposing a maximum limit on the size of the reply. Many SFTP implementations have a general limit on the size of SFTP messages anyway; typically 256kB as in OpenSSH or also in Apache MINA SSHD. |
| Pexip Infinity 30.0 through 40.x before 41.0 is affected by improper input validation in the web server that allows a malicious attacker to render a Pexip Infinity node inaccessible. |
| Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.63.2, an authenticated remote peer can send SSH_MSG_KEXINIT without the required SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT and then flood SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages while SessionKexState::InProgress prevents priority_receiver in russh/src/server/session.rs from being drained. The server continues processing network input and enqueues a ChannelOpenReply for each request on an unbounded channel, allowing one connection to grow memory until the process is terminated. This issue is fixed in version 0.63.2. |
| The CODESYS Gateway Client allocates memory based on a size field in a gateway response without enforcing an appropriate upper limit. An unauthenticated remote attacker controlling a malicious gateway can exploit this behavior to trigger excessive memory consumption, resulting in a denial-of-service condition thus leading to a total loss of availablity. |
| Pexip Infinity before 41.0 is affected by improper input validation in the signaling implementation which allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. Exploitation of this issue requires accessing a gateway call from a WebRTC/API client. |
| Denial-of-service in the Storage: StorageManager component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox ESR 153.4, Thunderbird 157, Thunderbird 153.4, and Firefox 157. |
| Denial-of-service in the Graphics component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox ESR 153.4, Thunderbird 157, Thunderbird 153.4, and Firefox 157. |
| Denial-of-service in the Networking component. This vulnerability was fixed in Thunderbird 157 and Firefox 157. |
| An uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Fireware OS's diagnostic tasks feature allows a low-privileged, authenticated user to cause a denial of service of the system's diagnostic tools by repeatedly starting and aborting a specially crafted diagnostic task through the web UI. |
| An uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the Fireware OS login process (wgagent) allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a specially crafted request. |
| Possible memory exhaustion in SFTP clients (DefaultSftpClient) in component sshd-sftp in Apache MINA SSHD versions 0.9.0 to 2.19.0 and 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5.
Apache
MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH. The sshd-sftp component provides support for SFTP.
The SFTP client implementation, when receiving a reply, did not check that this reply corresponded to a request sent earlier. Unsolicited replies would be stored but never consumed. A malicious server could keep sending unsolicited replies until available memory in the client was exhausted.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue. |
| Uncontrolled resource consumption in component ssd-scp in Apache MINA SSHD versions up to 2.19.0 or 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5. Apache MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH.
Component sshd-scp of Apache MINA SSHD provides a Java implementation of SCP. The SCP command protocol is line-oriented with LF-terminated lines. The protocol handler in sshd-scp did not impose any limit on the length of such protocol lines. A malicious peer just sending a junk command containing a never-ending sequence of characters but never a LF would cause the receiver to allocate memory to store this whole junk command, exhausting memory and crashing the application with an OutOfMemoryError.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue by enforcing an upper limit on the length of SCP protocol lines. |
| Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.
In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server's identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can
impersonate it.
The individual defects are:
- Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1).
- The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1).
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102510 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102510 .
This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final contain an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the QPACK encoder-stream instruction decoder (QpackEncoderHandler, installed on the peer-initiated unidirectional QPACK encoder stream, type 0x02). The handler accepts an attacker-declared string-literal length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE (~2 GiB) for the Name Length and Value Length fields of the "Insert With Literal Name" instruction (RFC 9204 §4.3.3), with no per-instruction or per-literal length cap and no cumulation-size limit; the existing HTTP/3 limits (maxHeaderListSize, maxUnknownFramePayloadLength, DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE) are not applied to this handler. A remote, unauthenticated peer with an established HTTP/3 connection to a default Netty HTTP/3 server can declare a very large literal length and then trickle fewer bytes than declared, causing the ByteToMessageDecoder MERGE cumulator to retain and grow the per-connection buffer, and ultimately triggering a large byte-array allocation. This leads to unbounded per-connection heap growth and OutOfMemoryError, resulting in denial of service. Fixed in 4.2.18.Final. |
| vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/2 server to make the client hold up to about 16 MiB per connection in frames it should reject, consuming client memory.
Mint.HTTP2.Frame.decode_next/2 in lib/mint/http2/frame.ex compares a frame with the client's max_frame_size (16,384 bytes by default) only once the whole declared payload has arrived. Until then it returns :more, and Mint.HTTP2 keeps every received byte in the connection buffer. A server can declare a frame length of up to 16,777,215 bytes and withhold the last byte, keeping roughly 1,024 times the advertised limit buffered for as long as the connection stays open. The server has to send every byte the client buffers, so there is no amplification, and the buffer stops at the 24-bit frame length limit.
This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.2. |
| Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in WP Store Locator < 3.0.0 versions. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.1, POST /two-factor has no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter, allowing an attacker with valid credentials to submit unlimited TOTP guesses against the three accepted codes created by config/google2fa.php window=1. A successful guess creates a fully authenticated session. When two_factor_enabled is 1, POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0 can disable two-factor authentication without OTP reverification, while required mode 2 prevents that opt-out. An administrator can also use POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset to clear another user's secret. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.1. |
| Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in Two Factor <= 0.16.0 versions. |
| Issue summary: A malicious remote peer may flood the local QUIC
stack with NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames by avoiding a limit check on
how many connection IDs the remote QUIC stack can use.
Impact summary: The local QUIC stack sends a RETIRE_CONN_ID frame
for every NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it receives. The RETIRE_CONN_ID
frame is dispatched via the Control Frame Queue (CFQ). If the remote
peer also withholds ACKs, then it can force the local stack
to allocate ~400MB (depending on ACK delay).
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: RFC 9000 sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 [1] describe the mechanism
by which a remote peer can notify the local QUIC stack to change the
destination connection ID (a.k.a. CID) the local stack uses to
identify the connection at the remote peer. Each CID is associated
with a sequence number. The sequence number is transmitted
in NEW_CONNECTION_ID and RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames to identify the CID
which is being either associated with a connection or retired.
The remote peer sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to let the local stack know
a new CID is being associated with an existing connection. The
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame carries the new CID, its sequence number, and the
retire-prior-to number. The retire-prior-to identifies existing
CIDs that are to be retired. The local QUIC stack must send a
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID for every destination CID whose sequence number
is less than retire-prior-to. The CID becomes retired after the
local stack receives an ACK for its RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame.
Although the OpenSSL QUIC stack supports at most one destination CID
for every connection, it can be tricked into processing more than
one RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame per connection. The OpenSSL QUIC
stack currently retires the destination CID as soon as it receives
the NEW_CONNECTION_ID, while in fact the destination CID must
be retired after an ACK for the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame is received.
Correcting the flawed logic also fixes the backlog growth.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-issuing-connection-ids
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of
the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. |
