| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Simply Schedule Appointments <= 1.6.12.31 versions. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Themeisle AI Chatbot for WordPress – Hyve Lite hyve-lite allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects AI Chatbot for WordPress – Hyve Lite: from n/a through 2.0.2. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in CozyThemes Cozy Blocks cozy-addons allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Cozy Blocks: from n/a through 2.2.23. |
| Subscriber Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Bookly <= 28.2 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in GiveWP <= 4.16.9 versions. |
| Subscriber Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Newsletters, Email Marketing, SMS and Popups by Omnisend <= 1.9.0 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Client Invoicing by Sprout Invoices <= 20.8.17 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Review Schema <= 3.1.0 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in REST API Log <= 1.7.2 versions. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in PublishPress PublishPress Series organize-series allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects PublishPress Series: from n/a through 3.1.3. |
| The File Uploads Addon for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.7.6 does not verify that the person requesting a customer-uploaded file is the customer who uploaded it, allowing unauthenticated attackers who know or guess a file's name to download other customers' uploaded files. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Ahmad JS Help Desk js-support-ticket allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects JS Help Desk: from n/a through 4.0.0. |
| The Checkout Field Manager (Checkout Manager) for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 7.9.7 does not properly validate the ownership of an attachment before deleting it, allowing any authenticated user such as a customer to delete arbitrary media attachments belonging to other users. |
| The Essential Real Estate WordPress plugin before 5.3.5 does not verify ownership of an invoice before rendering it in one of its AJAX actions, allowing an authenticated low-privileged user to read other users' invoices, including the invoice owner's name, account email address and financial details. |
| The UniPAY Payment Gateway For WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 2.4 does not perform any authorization check before returning an order's order-received URL for an attacker-supplied order id, exposing the order's secret key in the redirect and allowing unauthenticated attackers to enumerate orders and disclose customers' personal data (name, email address, phone number and address). |
| SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java (NWDI Cockpit)� does not perform sufficient authorization checks for certain functionality that retrieves sensitive information. An attacker with low privileges could send a specially crafted request to access sensitive information belonging to other system users. Successful exploitation results in a high impact on confidentiality, with no impact on integrity or availability of the application. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table.
In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"public_ref": {"not_eq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.
AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25. |
| MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model's captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster's org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user's organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker's organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.
The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.
The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who can see the cluster via sharing-group rules, or a site administrator, and enforces a field allow-list that excludes org_id and orgc_id from update writes, preserving original ownership. |