| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Windows Search Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Buffer over-read in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows SMB Client allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle VM VirtualBox product of Oracle Virtualization (component: Core). The supported version that is affected is 7.2.16. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle VM VirtualBox executes to compromise Oracle VM VirtualBox. While the vulnerability is in Oracle VM VirtualBox, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of Oracle VM VirtualBox. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.0 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H). |
| Buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 153.0.8010.52 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Text Shaping allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Port Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information with a physical attack. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Buffer overflow in PDFium in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 153.0.8010.52 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted PDF file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Error Reporting allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Image Acquisition allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| IBM MQ Appliance could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code due to a heap buffer overflow in protocol message processing before authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/ras: Fix cxl_rch_get_aer_info() out-of-bounds AER register read
cxl_rch_get_aer_info() copies the RCH Downstream Port AER capability from
the RCRB MMIO block using a readl() loop bounded by sizeof(struct
aer_capability_regs). This struct is a software layout and its embedded
struct pcie_tlp_log is larger than the on-wire AER capability. As a
result the loop reads past the mapped AER register block.
The over-read also populates the software-only tail fields including
header_log.header_len. An out-of-range header_len passed to
pcie_print_tlp_log() can then loop past the header log buffer and cause
a second out-of-bounds read.
The read was correct when introduced, but struct pcie_tlp_log has since
grown (Header Log and TLP Prefix Log sizes, header_len and flit fields),
so sizeof(struct aer_capability_regs) no longer matches the physical AER
capability.
Bound the read to the physical AER registers, header through the 16 byte
Header Log. Zero the destination first so the software-only fields are
deterministic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix out-of-bounds access in writeback_store()
Patch series "zram: fix stale scan bounds after reinitialization".
Both writeback_store() and read_block_state() derive their table scan
bounds from zram->disksize before acquiring dev_lock. If the device is
reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize between that read and lock
acquisition, the bound can describe the old table while the scan operates
on the new one. This can lead to out-of-bounds slot accesses.
Move both bound calculations under dev_lock so each bound remains
consistent with the table throughout its scan. Keep the fixes separate
because the affected interfaces originate from different commits and can
be backported independently.
This patch (of 2):
writeback_store() calculates the table scan bounds before taking dev_lock.
A reset followed by reconfiguration with a smaller disksize can therefore
replace zram->table while writeback_store() is waiting for the lock. Once
it acquires the lock, it sees an initialized device but scans the new
table using the old upper bound, resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Calculate the number of pages while holding dev_lock so the scan bound
matches the table protected by the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set
nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY
attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a
16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte
OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener,
kernel_bind).
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener
entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the
running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an
open-coded "nla_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr)" check that was too short
for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on
which loop noticed it.
Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list
once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a
transport name, and is long enough for its address family
(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)
for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking
nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly
with no side effects.
Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops
run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from
both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the
data. |
