| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to insufficient authorization checks in the quiz random question filter web service, an authenticated user with teacher privileges can modify random question settings in quizzes they do not have permission to manage. This flaw allows unauthorized users to alter assessment configurations across courses they do not oversee. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: fix clearing folios in memfd_pin_folios()
memfd_pin_folios() pins folios obtained directly from the page cache
without checking whether they are uptodate. However, shmem fallocate()
can leave newly allocated folios uncleared and not uptodate. Callers
such as udmabuf can then expose uninitialized memory to userspace.
Clear non-uptodate folios and mark them uptodate under the folio lock
before returning them to the caller.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: simplify description and comment ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: fix use-after-free in extts_fifo_show() reading tsevqs unlocked
extts_fifo_show() walks ptp->tsevqs with list_count_nodes() and then
list_first_entry() without holding ptp->tsevqs_lock, the spinlock that
"protects tsevqs from concurrent access". Every other accessor of the
list honours it: ptp_open() (list_add_tail), ptp_release() (list_del
followed by kfree of the per-fd queue), ptp_clock_release() and
ptp_clock_event() all take tsevqs_lock. extts_fifo_show() is the only
one that does not.
A per-fd timestamp queue is appended to tsevqs on open("/dev/ptpN") and
removed and freed on close(), both under tsevqs_lock:
scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &ptp->tsevqs_lock)
list_del(&queue->qlist);
bitmap_free(queue->mask);
kfree(queue);
So a read of /sys/class/ptp/ptpN/fifo running concurrently with a
close() of a /dev/ptpN fd can have list_count_nodes() walk into the
queue that close() is removing and freeing, dereferencing freed memory
(use-after-free) or a poisoned list pointer.
Take tsevqs_lock around the list walk. The fifo only ever draws from the
first queue, which is the registration-time queue created in
ptp_clock_register() and freed only in ptp_clock_release(); that cannot
run while the sysfs attribute is being read, so the dequeue from
queue->buf under queue->lock may stay outside tsevqs_lock and the lock
order is unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown
A demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL
populates that ACL's per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs()
*before* the ACL is linked onto tpg->acl_node_list by
target_add_node_acl():
core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl():
...
core_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */
target_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */
The LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only
tpg->acl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above
is invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the
se_lun->lun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when
the same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at
the same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by
target_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts
lun_deve_list:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ...
core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880
core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190
core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190
target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0
configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0
__x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80
The demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is
reachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is
a local configfs operation.
Commit 49cb77e297dc ("target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun
shutdown") introduced se_lun->lun_shutdown and guarded the *explicit* ACL
MappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode
automatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() ->
core_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard,
and the publish-after-populate ordering in
core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged.
Fix it in three cooperating parts:
1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list *before* creating its
dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them.
2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down,
checked under nacl->lun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes --
so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN
observes lun_shutdown and skips it.
3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto
lun->lun_deve_list while still holding nacl->lun_entry_mutex, in both
the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added
to nacl->lun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun->lun_deve_list only
after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could
take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist,
core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet-
linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable
would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking
both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually
exclusive, closing that window.
core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of
core_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply
skipped. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in RomanCode MapSVG mapsvg-lite-interactive-vector-maps allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects MapSVG: from n/a through 9.0.5. |
| Incorrect authorization in Autofill in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Incorrect authorization in Navigation in Google Chrome on on iOS prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation into a privileged page via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Missing authorization in LocalNetworkAccess in Google Chrome prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Uninitialized resource in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker to read memory inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| modified eCommerce Shopsoftware through 3.3.0 contains a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in admin/support.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject script via the module parameter. Attackers can trick a logged-in administrator into opening a crafted link to run script in the admin panel, reading CSRF tokens and changing shop settings. |
| modified eCommerce Shopsoftware through 3.3.0 contains a local file inclusion vulnerability that allows administrators to include arbitrary server files by storing ../ sequences in the content manager file name. Unauthenticated requests to shop_content.php then pass the stored path to include(), executing embedded PHP in uploaded content files or images as the web server user. |
| When the setting for saving requests to non-existent
pages (404) is enabled, JTL-Shop stores the raw requested URL in its
redirect table, and the administration backend renders it without output
encoding in the form used to edit a redirect. An unauthenticated remote
attacker can store script code with a single request, which is executed in the
browser session of an administrator who opens the affected redirect,
allowing actions to be performed with the administrator's privileges. The
setting is disabled by default in new installations but may still be
enabled in older ones. |
| The visitor tracking of JTL-Shop automatically
registers unknown crawler user agents without filtering the value, and the stored
value is rendered without output encoding on several pages of the
administration backend (search engine statistics, crawler dashboard widget, crawler
edit form, sitemap export download list and campaign details). An
unauthenticated remote attacker can store script code with a single request. The code is
executed in the browser session of an administrator who opens one of these
pages, allowing actions to be performed with the administrator's privileges. |
| The preview mode of the OPC (OnPage Composer) page
builder of JTL-Shop is activated by a request parameter alone and
renders page data supplied in the request without checking for an authenticated
backend session with the corresponding permission. Several portlet properties
are output without output encoding. An unauthenticated remote attacker
can thereby cause script code to be executed in the browser of a
visitor or administrator who opens a crafted link; in the case of an
administrator, actions can be performed with the administrator's privileges. Third-party
plugins whose portlets evaluate property values as templates can
additionally be made to execute template code through the same entry point. This is
a separate flaw in such plugins and does not affect the portlets of JTL-Shop itself. |
| ServiceNow has addressed an indirect prompt injection security issue that was identified in the Email Response AI Agent of Now Assist for CSM. We are not currently aware of malicious exploitation against ServiceNow instances.
This remediation was deployed centrally to the Email Response AI Agent (Now Assist for CSM) and does not require a platform version upgrade or hot fix; no version-specific backports apply. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: aic79xx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in device reset
Since commit c67e63800446 ("scsi: aic79xx: Do not reference SCSI command
when resetting device") the device reset SCB has no SCSI command, but
ahd_linux_dev_reset() still sets its residual, and ahd_abort_scbs(), which
completes it, sets its status. Seen on an AIC-7902 when a failing disk
triggered a device reset, which killed the SCSI error handler:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000009c
EIP: ahd_linux_dev_reset.cold+0xee/0x26e
Add NULL command checks to the accessors in aic79xx_osm.h. Also skip
autosense for an SCB without a command and complete it with ahd_done()
right away: the REQUEST SENSE path can clear SCB_DEVICE_RESET, after which
ahd_done() would dereference the missing command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors
xfrm4_local_error() passes skb->sk to inet_sk() and ip_local_error()
without ensuring it points to a full socket. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned
by TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets.
xfrm4_tunnel_check_size() already checks sk_fullsock() since commit
1620c88887b1 ("xfrm: Fix the usage of skb->sk"), so iptfs_is_too_big() is
the only remaining IPv4 caller passing a request socket here: the sk it
tests is the listener, while skb->sk is the request socket.
When IP-TFS rejects such an skb because it exceeds its payload MTU, the
local error path treats the request socket as a struct inet_sock. KASAN
reports a slab-out-of-bounds read in ip_local_error() beyond the
request_sock_TCP allocation.
Resolve the skb owner with skb_to_full_sk() before accessing inet_sock
state or reporting the error. This maps a request socket to its listener
and rejects sockets that cannot be used as full sockets, matching what
commit 6973a21ee73c ("ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths")
did for xfrm6_local_error(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"),
I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace:
panic+0x58/0x5c
die+0x160/0x178
bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4
call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0
do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74
el1_brk64+0x34/0x54
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc
el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)
sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c
sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++
thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)
sync_file_ioctl()
sync_file_get_name()
dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name()
ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops)
if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e.
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL)
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops)
!= &drm_crtc_fence_ops)
+++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal,
which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON()
triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and
because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an
unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same
problem and is fixed by this patch as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind
In [1], sashiko reported the following issue:
=== snip ===
Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence()
creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or
drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to
userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC.
The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops
(like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after
the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent
freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via
synchronize_rcu().
If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device
hot-unplug:
CPU1 (Userspace)
sync_file_get_name()
ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops);
if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
// Preempted or delayed here
CPU2 (Driver Teardown)
Signals the fence (setting fence->ops = NULL)
Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period
CPU1 (Resumes)
ops->get_driver_name(fence) -> drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC
return crtc->dev->driver->name; // Use-after-free
...
Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace
period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the
use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access
the freed CRTC structure?
=== snap ===
I believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements
the suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding
with destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and
get_timeline_name() can still work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit
Packets injected into an xfrm interface (e.g. AF_PACKET on an xfrmi
device) reach the xfrm output path without IP header validation, but
xfrm4_transport_output() uses iph->ihl for __skb_pull() and memmove()
and expects the header to be valid.
vti_tunnel_xmit() already calls pskb_inet_may_pull() before handing
packets to the xfrm output path. Do the same in xfrmi_xmit() and
perform the header checks ip_rcv_core()/ip6_rcv_core() do on entry
to the IP stack: reject wrong IP versions and malformed IPv4 header
lengths. |