| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: do not copy up an xattr value that was never read
Copy-up stores uninitialized kernel memory in an xattr of the upper
file, where the user can read it.
ovl_copy_xattr() may only pass bytes to ovl_do_setxattr() that
ovl_do_getxattr() has read. When the read fails with -ERANGE the
function asks for the size again, and if the new size fits the buffer
it stores the buffer although nothing was read into it. The buffer
comes from kvmalloc(), or it still holds the value of the previous
xattr.
A FUSE lower layer that answers every sized GETXATTR with -ERANGE made
copy-up store 4096 bytes that the server never sent, with a kernel
pointer in them, as an xattr of the upper file.
Fix this by failing the copy-up with -EIO when the size that follows
-ERANGE fits the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix a torn path in ovl_get_redirect()
A hard link of a metacopy file that races with a rename of an ancestor
stores a redirect to the wrong lower file.
Each component of an absolute redirect must be the name that a dentry
has in the parent that the walk continues with. ovl_get_redirect()
copies the name under d_lock and calls dget_parent() after the unlock,
and the callers for a hard link hold no lock that stops a rename across
directories. A rename between the two steps combines the old name with
the new parent.
With delays in ovl_get_redirect(), an unprivileged user hard-linked a
metacopy file while renaming its ancestor to another directory, the
stored redirect named another lower path, and after a remount the file
showed the data of a root-only file.
Fix this by taking the parent first and checking it again under d_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir
With nfs_export=on, data written through a file handle to a lower file,
i.e. a file that exists only in a lower layer of the overlay, can be
lost on the next mount. A lookup of the file by name then returns -EIO.
Also, a file with one name reports st_nlink 2 once it has been copied to
the upper layer. After such a file is removed, its file handle can still
open it until the next mount.
Before a lower file is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it
to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
The index directory is $workdir/index, where $workdir is the directory
given by the workdir= option. Each entry is named after the file handle
of a lower inode, so that overlayfs can get from the handle to the
copied up inode.
With nfs_export=on, copy up indexes every non-directory: it copies the
file to an entry in the index directory and then hard links that entry
into the upper directory. The index entry is an extra link to the upper
inode, so overlayfs stores the link count that users should see in the
overlay.nlink xattr.
A file can also be opened by handle, either by an NFS client or by a
process with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH calling open_by_handle_at(). If the
file is not in the dcache, its overlay dentry is disconnected, i.e. it
has no parent yet. Copy up then creates the index entry but no hard link
in the upper directory. The index entry has i_nlink 1 and holds the only
copy of the data written to the file.
ovl_get_nlink() reads the stored count. Its caller passes a default,
which the function returns if there is no stored count. If the lower
inode has i_nlink 1, the function returns the default without reading
the xattr. That was correct as long as only lower files with multiple
links were indexed.
On the next mount, ovl_verify_index() looks for orphans, i.e. index
entries of files whose last name was removed. For an index entry with
i_nlink 1, it passes a default of 0 to ovl_get_nlink() and treats a
result of 0 as an orphan. Here the lower inode also has i_nlink 1, so
the result is the default. ovl_indexdir_cleanup() then replaces the
entry with a whiteout, which in the index marks a file as deleted. The
written data is lost.
A lookup by name then returns -EIO, because a whiteout as the index
entry of a lower file that still exists is a bad index.
ovl_get_inode() gets the wrong count the same way. Its default is the
i_nlink of the upper inode, which includes the index entry, so a copied
up file with one name reports st_nlink 2.
When that name is removed, the count drops to 1 rather than 0.
ovl_nlink_end() replaces the index entry with a whiteout only at a count
of 0, so the entry stays, and the handle of the removed file still opens
it.
Reproduced by writing through open_by_handle_at() to an uncached lower
file with one link. After a remount the data was lost, and the name
returned EIO.
Fix this by adding an argument to ovl_get_nlink() that says whether the
caller found an index entry, and by skipping the xattr only if the
caller found none.
Known gaps:
- An index entry that a kernel without this patch left behind for a
removed file now stays, and the handle of that file keeps working. The
entry has i_nlink 1 and a stored count of 1, just like the entry of a
file that was only written by handle. Without this patch, the next
mount treated it as an orphan. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: skip copy up of empty security.capability
ovl_copy_xattr() gives up if it can't read an attribute that
listxattr() has named. An empty security.capability, which anybody has
been able to store on any file for a long time, is such a case: it is
listed, and getxattr() has nothing to return for it. A file in a lower
layer that carries one can't be copied up: it can't be written to,
renamed or have its mode changed.
There is nothing to copy if there are no data. Go on with the next
one.
[amir: treat -EINVAL as no capability too, and do the same in
ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix buffer overruns in xfs_ioc_attr_list
When we converted the al_offset array in struct xfs_attrlist into a VLA,
the size of the object shrank by 4 bytes. Unfortunately, the buffer
size validation in the attrlist ioctl wasn't updated to notice this, so
the al_offset[0] assignment blindly writes off the end of the buffer.
LOLLM noticed the omitted check and complained. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: avoid cross-rtgroup reaping after a repair
LOLLM notices that the extents stored in a xrtb_bitmap (aka xfs_rtblock
bitmap) can span multiple rtgroups due to two circumstances. The first
is that the size of an rtgroup is an exact power of two, which means
that rtgroups are adjacent in the segmented xfs_rtblock_t address space.
This is fairly common to reduce the amount of multiplication and
division needed to handle space on the rt volume.
The second is that (unlike in the original rtgroups design), rtgroups do
not have fixed-location metadata like AGs do, which means that there's
nothing to force a break between rtgroups.
Therefore, we must loop through the rtgroups in xreap_rtmeta_extent to
avoid running off the end of an rtgroup while reaping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: actually lock the metafile reservation when adjusting after repair
LOLLM reported that xrep_reset_metafile_resv performs unlocked loads
and stores to the metadata file space reservation counters and thus can
race with other threads. Fix this by taking the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: always reset incore attr fork buffer when resetting fork
LOLLM noticed that the local format attr fork verifier depends on
if_bytes being set correctly. However, the fork reset function doesn't
reset that correctly, which can cause post-repair verifier failures.
Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't fix the directory tree if live update fails
LOLLM complains that we don't double-check dl->aborted one last time to
before committing repairs to the filesystem. This is important because
the live update handler could have set ->aborted if it encountered a
runtime error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't repair fs summary counters with garbage
LOLLM noticed that if we scan the filesystem and come up with totally
garbage numbers for the summary counters, we don't actually mark the
scan incomplete. Because we don't do this, repair can install the
garbage values into the filesystem, making things worse. Don't do that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix lost errno returned from xfarray_foliosort
LOLLM noticed that we stop the sort early but don't actually pass along
the error code, which could enable repair code to continue running with
an unsorted array. Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: abort dirtree repair if the live update hook dies
LOLLM notices that if the live update hook for the directory tree repair
code hits an error, it will set dl->aborted and stops working. If the
repair code ever sees that condition, it ought to bail out immediately
instead of continuing with obsolete data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: mark overfull dabtree node blocks as corrupt
LOLLM observes that we need to range-check the dabtree node record count
before using it to index an array. Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_payload: restrict checksum offsets to known values
We need to prevent userspace from corrupting e.g. tcp->doff, because
many locations in conntrack and conntrack helpers rely on
nf_conntrack_in() having validated the packet headers.
nft_payload allows to alter headers later which invalidates this
assumption.
The 'Fixes' commit restricts writes to safe fields, but there is
another side channel: the checksum location.
Restrict this too. Reported via sashiko/gemini. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtnetlink: wait for RCU readers in rtnl_link_unregister()
rtnl_link_ops_get() finds ops on link_ops under rcu_read_lock() and only
then takes ops->srcu. rtnl_link_unregister() unlinks ops, then calls
synchronize_srcu() and cleanup_srcu_struct() without first waiting for
RCU readers. A reader that found ops before list_del_rcu() and has not yet
taken ops->srcu is not waited for.
Such a reader then locks a cleaned-up srcu_struct and keeps using ops
after the module that owns it is gone. rtnl_newlink() and
rtnl_dump_ifinfo() both look up ops without RTNL, the latter for any
user that dumps links filtered by kind.
With delays added between the lookup and srcu_read_lock() in
rtnl_link_ops_get(), and before rtnl_link_ops_put() in
rtnl_dump_ifinfo(), running "ip link show type dummy" alongside
"rmmod dummy" on a KASAN kernel gives:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffffc02ff318 by task ip/147
Call Trace:
__srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70
rtnl_dump_ifinfo.cold+0x30/0x3b
rtnl_dumpit+0x7a/0x1b0
netlink_dump+0x486/0x11b0
__netlink_dump_start+0x661/0x910
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x611/0x9e0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x380
netlink_unicast+0x605/0x830
netlink_sendmsg+0x6d0/0xbb0
__sys_sendto+0x335/0x3a0
Call synchronize_rcu() before synchronize_srcu(), as
rtnl_af_unregister() already does. This should be enough because
rtnl_link_ops_get() is the only RCU walker of link_ops, and it takes
ops->srcu before rcu_read_unlock(), so every reader that found ops is
covered by synchronize_srcu() once the RCU grace period ends. The extra
grace period only costs time at module unload.
Readers and the writer were serialized by RTNL until link_ops got its
own mutex, which is why the missing RCU wait did not matter before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: reject out-of-range attribute value lengths in xfs_attr_copy_value
xfs_attr_copy_value() takes the value length as a signed int and, for a
remote xattr, is handed args->rmtvaluelen. That field is filled from the
on-disk __be32 xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote.valuelen in
xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue(), so a crafted length such as 0x80000000 is
stored into the signed rmtvaluelen as a negative number.
The "buffer too small" guard in xfs_attr_copy_value() is a signed
comparison:
if (args->valuelen < valuelen)
return -ERANGE;
A negative valuelen therefore compares as smaller than the caller's
buffer size, skips the -ERANGE path, and is then used as a copy length,
leading to an out-of-bounds copy of a full remote block into a small
getxattr(2) buffer on a mounted crafted image.
Reject a value length that is negative or larger than the maximum xattr
size before it is used, so a bogus on-disk length can no longer slip
through the value copier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: reject remote xattr entries with an out-of-range value length
xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() validates a remote attribute entry's name
but never bounds its on-disk value length (xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote.
valuelen, a __be32). A crafted leaf with valuelen = 0x80000000 passes
the verifier and the CRC.
That length is later assigned into the signed int args->rmtvaluelen
(xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue), becoming negative, which slips past the signed
-ERANGE check in xfs_attr_copy_value(); a getxattr() with a small buffer
then memcpy()s a full remote block into the small kvalue buffer
(xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout) -- a heap out-of-bounds write with
attacker-controlled content, from an unprivileged getxattr(2) on a
mounted crafted image.
Reject remote entries whose value length exceeds XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX in
the leaf verifier, so the malicious block is rejected at read time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: always forget cached ACLs if the attr fork swap succeeds
LOLLM complains that xrep_xattr_rebuild_tree omits the xfs_forget_acl
call if the attr fork swap succeeds (and hence the acls might have
changed) but reaping the old attr fork fails. Fix it so that we always
purge the cached acls if the swap succeeds, even if subsequent steps do
not. This avoids some cache coherency problems with access controls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound da-node entry count against the correct geometry
xfs_da3_node_verify() bounds the node entry count against the larger of
the directory and attribute geometries because, as a buffer verifier, it
cannot tell whether the block belongs to the directory or the attribute
tree. When the directory block size exceeds the fs block size (e.g.
mkfs.xfs -n size=64k -b size=4k), an attribute node buffer is a single fs
block that holds only m_attr_geo->node_ents entries, yet a crafted attr
node may claim a count up to m_dir_geo->node_ents and still pass the
verifier.
xfs_da3_node_lookup_int() then indexes btree[] up to that count during
its binary search -- an out-of-bounds read via getxattr/listxattr on a
mounted crafted image.
The buffer verifier is the wrong place to tighten this: it has no fork
context, and the transaction-less read path used by getxattr does not run
xfs_da3_node_set_type() either. xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(), on the other
hand, always runs on that path and holds args->geo, the geometry of the
fork actually being searched. Bound the entry count against
args->geo->node_ents there, before walking the entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery
xlog_recover_inode_commit_pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr
fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without
bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.:
len = item->ri_buf[2].iov_len;
memcpy(XFS_DFORK_DPTR(dip), src, len);
The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels
(CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG off), and xfs_dinode_verify() runs only after the copy.
A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds
write at mount time. The XFS_ILOG_DBROOT sibling already passes
XFS_DFORK_DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths
did not.
Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before
copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not
fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has
been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the
on-disk inode. |