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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98208 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: sdio_uart: fix xmit_fifo leak when the port table is full sdio_uart_add_port() allocates the transmit fifo before claiming a slot in sdio_uart_table[]. When all UART_NR slots are taken, it returns -EBUSY with the fifo still allocated, but the probe error path only kfree()s the port, leaking the transmit fifo. Free the fifo in the failure path of sdio_uart_add_port() itself so the function retains nothing on error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98207 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: spi: reset bytes_xfered before retrying CRC failures mmc_spi_data_do() updates data->bytes_xfered after each block has been transferred successfully. If a later block in the same data request fails with a CRC error, data->bytes_xfered may therefore contain the number of bytes completed before the failing block. mmc_spi_request() has a private recovery path for such CRC failures. It sends STOP_TRANSMISSION, clears data->error and jumps back to crc_recover to issue the same command and data request again. However, it does not clear data->bytes_xfered before the retry. If the retry succeeds, the request is completed with the bytes from the failed attempt still included in data->bytes_xfered. For a multi-block request this can make the completed request report more bytes than were transferred by the successful retry, and can even exceed the request size when most blocks completed before the CRC error. This is most likely to be observed on MMC-over-SPI systems where long multi-block transfers occasionally hit a data CRC error but the mmc_spi-internal retry succeeds. The data itself is retried, but the completion accounting is not. Clear data->bytes_xfered together with data->error before repeating the request so the final completion reports only the bytes transferred by the successful attempt. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98205 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - zero absinfo before partial copy in EVIOCSABS The EVIOCSABS handler copies at most the user supplied ioctl size into an uninitialized on-stack struct input_absinfo: if (copy_from_user(&abs, p, min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(struct input_absinfo)))) The size comes from _IOC_SIZE() of the ioctl command and is therefore fully controlled by userspace. A short size leaves the trailing part of the structure holding whatever was on the kernel stack, and the whole structure is then stored into the device: dev->absinfo[t] = abs; EVIOCGABS hands that back to userspace, disclosing the stale stack bytes. Only the resolution field is currently cleared, which covers the legacy struct layout but not an arbitrarily short size. Zero the structure before the copy so any part not supplied by the caller reads back as zero. The existing resolution fixup is kept, since it also handles a size that partially overlaps that field. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98204 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: rmi_smbus - fix out-of-bounds read in rmi_smb_write_block() When chunking writes into SMBus blocks in rmi_smb_write_block(), the loop calculates block_len using the original total length (len) instead of the remaining length (cur_len). If len is greater than 32 bytes (SMB_MAX_COUNT), block_len remains 32 for every iteration, even on the final partial chunk where fewer than 32 bytes remain. This causes smb_block_write() to read 32 bytes from the advanced data buffer pointer, reading past the end of the input buffer. Fix this by calculating block_len using cur_len and advancing the buffer and address pointers by block_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98203 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: soc_button_array - check btns_desc->package.count Check that btns_desc->package.count is not 0 before accessing btns_desc->package.elements[0]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix GPF in suspend and resume when unbound Transport drivers (such as rmi_i2c and rmi_spi) invoke rmi_driver_suspend() and rmi_driver_resume() on their child rmi_dev device during system power management events. However, transport drivers are fully registered and operational even if the physical RMI driver failed to bind or probe the rmi_dev device. When rmi_driver_suspend() or rmi_driver_resume() is called on an unbound rmi_dev, dev_get_drvdata() returns NULL. Calling rmi_disable_irq() or rmi_enable_irq() without driver data attached causes a NULL pointer dereference and General Protection Fault when attempting to lock data->enabled_mutex. Fix this by checking if driver data is attached to rmi_dev in rmi_driver_suspend() and rmi_driver_resume(), exiting early if no driver data is present. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98201 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: zero ff_effect before compat copy in input_ff_effect_from_user In the compat path input_ff_effect_from_user() aliases the caller's native struct ff_effect with the smaller struct ff_effect_compat and copies only the compat sized prefix: compat_effect = (struct ff_effect_compat *)effect; if (copy_from_user(compat_effect, buffer, sizeof(struct ff_effect_compat))) The tail of the native structure is never written. Callers pass an uninitialized on-stack object, for example evdev_do_ioctl() for EVIOCSFF, so those bytes keep their previous stack contents. input_ff_upload() then stores the full native structure in ff->effects[id], from where a uinput based force feedback daemon can read it back via UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD, disclosing kernel stack memory to userspace. Zero the effect before the compat copy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98199 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/core) increase number of phases and add new mask Increase the number of phases to 16 as a new upcoming device supports such a number. While at it, add a new mask for controlling the source of the output voltage. Note (groeck): This patch was meant to prepare for support of MAX20826 and compatible devices, which support more than 10 phases per page. However, Sashiko reports that the mp2975 driver already supports up to 14 phases, and the mp2856 driver supports up to 12 phases. This already has the potential for out-of-bounds writes when probing the affected chips, making this patch a bug fix. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (w83791d) remove fan/pwm 4-5 sysfs group on remove When the fan/pwm 4-5 pins are not used as GPIO, w83791d_probe() creates the w83791d_group_fanpwm45 sysfs group on the I2C client device. The probe error path removes this group when a later initialization step fails, but the normal remove path only removes w83791d_group. As a result, the optional fan/pwm 4-5 sysfs files can remain after the driver is unbound. The callbacks associated with these files access the driver data, which is devm allocated and released after driver unbind. Leaving the sysfs files behind can therefore result in accesses to stale driver data. Remove w83791d_group_fanpwm45 during normal teardown as well. This issue was found by manual code inspection. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98193 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: libipw: reject TKIP frames without a full MIC libipw_michael_mic_verify() assumes that an skb contains an eight-byte Michael MIC. A short TKIP frame makes the unsigned payload length wrap, causing michael_mic() to read past the skb. Check that the MIC is present before verifying it, and use the existing MICHAEL_MIC_LEN constant for all MIC lengths in the verifier. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98188 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: validate curve data length in the calibration curve converters p54_convert_rev0() and p54_convert_rev1() read calibration curve data from the device-supplied EEPROM entry using channel and points-per-channel counts taken verbatim from that same entry, so an entry that declares more data than it carries drives an out-of-bounds read past the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN reproducer of the conversion loop). The sibling converters p54_convert_output_limits() and p54_convert_db() already validate their counts against the entry length; this path was missed. Reject the entry when the counts do not fit in the entry data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98187 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: require a full exp_if record in PDR_INTERFACE_LIST The PDR_INTERFACE_LIST loop only checks that the record start is within the entry before reading an entire struct exp_if from it. A truncated trailing record makes the if_id/variant reads cross the entry boundary into the heap beyond the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN reproducer of the loop). The variant also feeds the synth front-end selection, so this is not only a leak. Advance only while a full record still fits in the entry. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98185 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: validate scan response extents mwifiex_ret_802_11_scan() subtracts the fixed response fields and the firmware-provided BSS length from resp->size without first proving that either extent fits. A short response or oversized BSS length can therefore underflow tlv_buf_size and make the TLV parser walk beyond the command response. Compute the fixed extent from the selected normal or background scan response. Validate that the fixed fields and BSS data fit before deriving the TLV extent and entering the parser. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98183 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid out-of-bounds read for empty PREQ elements ieee80211_mesh_preq_size_ok() derives the location of the PREQ bottom fields before checking whether the element contains even the fixed header. ieee80211_mesh_hwmp_preq_get_bottom() reads the flags byte to account for the optional Address Extension field. Consequently, an empty PREQ element causes a one-byte read beyond its declared payload. Move the helper call after both size checks, so the bottom fields are only accessed when they are present. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98182 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: refuse to make a monitor active when it has no queue A monitor interface only gets a TXQ if it's created active, and one can't be added later. Setting the flag on a down interface is still allowed, so the driver is handed a monitor with no queue. ath9k dereferences it: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000066 RIP: 0010:ath_tx_node_init+0x49/0x170 [ath9k] ath9k_add_interface+0x10c/0x140 [ath9k] drv_add_interface+0x54/0x250 [mac80211] ieee80211_do_open+0x32f/0x800 [mac80211] Reached with CAP_NET_ADMIN by "iw dev X set monitor active" followed by "ip link set X up". RTNL is held, so netlink operations block behind it. Refuse the flag when there is no queue to give. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98181 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gud: fix out-of-bounds write in gud_plane_atomic_check() The plane property loop uses req->properties[num_properties + i] as write index while simultaneously incrementing `num_properties` inside the loop. At iteration i, num_properties has also incremented by i, so the write is done at `initial_num_properties + 2*i`, skipping every other index and advancing by 2 per iteration. With just 2 connector and 32 plane properties the last write happens at index 64, one slot past the end of the 64-slot (indices 0–63) allocation. A USB device can trigger OOB by advertising the maximum number of properties. Fix by dropping the redundant `+ i`; num_properties is already the correct running index, as gud_connector_fill_properties() fills the preceding slots. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98180 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects Both struct msm_ringbuffer and struct msm_gem_vm embed a struct drm_gpu_scheduler. msm_ringbuffer_destroy() and the VM free callback msm_gem_vm_free() call drm_sched_fini() on the embedded scheduler and then free the containing object with plain kfree(). drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence->sched->name, and the scheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on signalling. A finished fence exported to userspace (the submit out-fence, or a VM_BIND fence, via sync_file / drm_syncobj) keeps pointing at the embedded scheduler after the ring/VM is freed, so a later get_timeline_name() -- reachable unprivileged through SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed slab memory (KASAN slab-use-after-free read). Per the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a signalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing objects with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree(). Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/750234/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-98179 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix rmmio iounmap skipped on device removal amdgpu_pci_remove() calls drm_dev_unplug() before fini_sw(), so drm_dev_enter() is already false there and the iounmap() guarded by it is skipped. This .remove path runs on both hot-unplug and plain rmmod, so the register BAR ioremap mapping leaks one instance per unload. Unmap rmmio unconditionally (guard only on non-NULL) and drop the now unused idx. (cherry picked from commit dd6f86a97260e5207d3329ad03aa89fdad61b1e6) | ||||
| CVE-2026-98176 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-06 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow with ffs in EOP ring size calc The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int)) - 1 - 1 But ffs can in theory return 1 or 0, so this could underflow (although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096). Change this to ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int) / 4) using properties of logarithms. (cherry picked from commit 4f18c56630383c14bfc6b2d65f88f2f895d2121a) | ||||