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Search Results (412676 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74724 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: avoid out-of-bounds write in ip_vs_nat_icmp Sashiko warns that local attacker can modify the packet while it is processed by IPVS. Some places read the IP ihl field multiple times which can cause out-of-bounds access. One such place is ip_vs_nat_icmp where we can write after the validated area. Fix it by providing ciph argument just like it is done for IPv6 and use ciph->len as offset to the embedded transport header. Modify some IPv4 header checks by reading the ihl field only once. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74720 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer. Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields. Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity fields consistent. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74717 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: fw_tracer, return NULL on create error Tracer creation can fail by returning either NULL or ERR_PTR. The return value is stored without a check on the device, and users treat ERR_PTR and NULL the same way. This also causes a crash in the core dump logic, which is missing the ERR_PTR check and ends up dereferencing it, as shown in the trace below. Switch tracer creation to return NULL on failure only, so callers only need a single NULL check. Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core ipv6 mlx5_core CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.19.7 #1 PREEMPT(none) Workqueue: mlx5_health0001:01:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] pstate: a3400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core] lr : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x40/0xe0 [mlx5_core] sp : ffff800081cf3c40 x29: ffff800081cf3c90 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff000080018828 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff000080304a05 x23: ffff800081cf3d80 x22: ffff0000847e01a0 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000847e01a0 x19: ffffffffffffffa1 x18: ffff80008310bbf0 x17: ffff800080119650 x16: ffff80008010df54 x15: ffff80008010d4ac x14: ffff800079c202e4 x13: ffff80008002fe60 x12: ffff800080119650 x11: ffff80008010df54 x10: ffff80008010d4ac x9 : ffff800079c203d8 x8 : ffff800081cf3c88 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : 0000000000000030 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000c5c4000e Call trace: mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core] (P) mlx5_fw_reporter_dump+0x30/0x2e0 [mlx5_core] devlink_health_do_dump+0x9c/0x160 devlink_health_report+0x1c0/0x288 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xac/0xc0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x15c/0x3d8 worker_thread+0x18c/0x320 kthread+0x148/0x228 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: b9400000 5ac00800 7a401800 540003ca (3940a260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x000000,00078031,75fce5a1,35fffe67 Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception ]--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-74714 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto the ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets rsk_refcnt to 3. Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the lock guarantees sk_refcnt > 0. That assumption does not hold for request_sock: CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- tcp_conn_request() reqsk_queue_hash_req() inet_ehash_insert(req) spin_lock(bucket) __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req) // rsk_refcnt == 0 spin_unlock(bucket) bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() spin_lock(bucket) sock_hold(req) <-- addition on 0 spin_unlock(bucket) refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 3) // clobbers saturated value which surfaces as: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1 Call Trace: bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170 bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70 bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410 vfs_read+0xb9/0x380 The iterator's stolen reference is lost when the publishing CPU's refcount_set() overwrites the count, leaving the socket one reference short. When the last legitimate owner drops its reference the reqsk is freed while still reachable, leading to use-after-free. This reproduces in seconds with tcp_syncookies=0, a handful of threads doing connect()/close() to a local listener while others read an iter/tcp link in a tight loop. Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and skip the socket on failure. A skipped socket is still part of the bucket, so keep counting it in expected. The reallocations are sized from expected, and a request sock whose refcount gets published while the lock is held across the last realloc must already have room. A skipped socket is counted in expected but never batched, so end_sk can be short of expected on a batch that is actually complete. Decide completeness by whether the walk left any socket behind instead. The WARN after the locked realloc checks the same, replacing an end_sk == expected check that could not hold on that path since commit cdec67a489d4 ("bpf: tcp: Make sure iter->batch always contains a full bucket snapshot"). If every matching socket in a bucket is mid-init (refcount 0), end_sk stays 0. Advance to the next bucket rather than returning a batch entry that was never filled this round. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74710 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: require at least 16 bytes of TX metadata AF_XDP accepts a TX metadata length as small as eight bytes, but every supported request needs the flags plus at least one eight-byte request field. Such short metadata also lets the kernel read beyond the registered area. Require 16 bytes rather than sizeof(struct xsk_tx_metadata) to preserve compatibility with applications that do not use launch-time metadata. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74708 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate launch-time metadata size Launch-time metadata extends beyond the first 16 bytes of struct xsk_tx_metadata. Reject the request when the registered metadata area does not contain the complete field. Snapshot the validated flags for the generic transmit path and use that snapshot for request and completion processing, avoiding inconsistent decisions if user space changes the flags concurrently. Note that only xsk_skb_metadata is properly using the flags, __xsk_buff_get_metadata ignores them. Next commits address that. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74707 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate metadata when processing requests The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation. Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74705 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 10 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation __skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the tunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb->head, the saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid. Get the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74704 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_cake: drop WARN_ON(1) for malformed packets in ACK filter The sch_cake ACK filter parses packets to find the TCP header and filter duplicated ACKs if the flow is backlogged. The parsing code contains a WARN_ON(1) which can be triggered by a malformed IP header in certain cases. Depending on the system configuration, this leads either to either spamming dmesg with warnings, or a panic if panic_on_warn is set. The code already correctly skips the offending packet in the branch that triggers the warning, so the WARN_ON itself doesn't really serve any purpose. So just drop it altogether to avoid the inconvenient side effects. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74701 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/openvswitch: check Ethernet header length in key_extract() When a packet arrives on an ARPHRD_NONE device (e.g. TUN), ovs_flow_key_extract() trusts the user-provided skb->protocol field: if it is ETH_P_TEB, the packet is classified as MAC_PROTO_ETHERNET and key_extract() is called without ensuring the skb has ETH_HLEN (14) bytes of linear data. key_extract() unconditionally pulls 2 * ETH_ALEN bytes for MAC addresses and parse_ethertype() pulls 2 more, either of which triggers a kernel BUG in __skb_pull() when the linear area is too small. kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2848! RIP: 0010:key_extract+0xa7e/0xd90 net/openvswitch/flow.c:933 ovs_flow_key_extract+0x419/0xa70 ovs_vport_receive+0x222/0x390 netdev_frame_hook+0x3e0/0x630 tun_get_user+0x2d0c/0x38e0 Fixed by calling check_header() in key_extract() before accessing the Ethernet header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74700 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers Another challenge with unlocked filters. There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request and cause a race. Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio: 1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both drop filter_chain_lock 2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain 3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new and returns u32_tp to the caller. Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind "flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero. At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following (illustrated by the PoC): [ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) [ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524 Call Trace: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Allocated by task 526: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Freed by task 522: kfree u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662) tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446) tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459) Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held. To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here for future cleanup if deemed necessary): The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy() and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic, fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy() (u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter. A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether they are running in an unlocked context. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74696 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TFO max_qlen accounting across reuseport migration A listener's TCP_FASTOPEN max_qlen stops being accurate and lets through far more pending Fast Open requests than it was configured for. This only shows up with SO_REUSEPORT listener migration, where closing a listener hands its still-pending TFO children over to a surviving one. fastopenq.qlen is charged in tcp_fastopen_create_child() when the child is created and uncharged in reqsk_fastopen_remove() when the handshake completes. The uncharge follows rsk_listener of the request the child points at, and inet_reqsk_clone() has repointed the child at a new request owned by the new listener, so the ++ and the -- land on two different sockets. The new listener's qlen drifts negative and its limit no longer binds. Charge the new listener during migration, like reqsk_queue_migrated() already does for queue->young and queue->qlen. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74692 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix TOCTOU race between smc_listen_out() and listener close smc_listen_out() reads lsmc->sk.sk_state without the listener lock, then acquires lock_sock_nested() only after the check passes. This opens a window where smc_close_active() can transition the listener to SMC_CLOSED, call smc_close_cleanup_listen() to drain the accept queue, and release the lock, all between the lockless read and the delayed lock acquisition: smc_listen_work (smc_hs_wq) smc_close_active() ------------------------------- ------------------------- release_sock(child) if (sk_state == SMC_LISTEN) TRUE lock_sock(listener) sk_state = SMC_CLOSED smc_close_cleanup_listen() release_sock(listener) flush_work(tcp_listen_work) lock_sock_nested(listener) smc_accept_enqueue(listener, child) /* child enqueued on dead listener */ smc_close_active() flushes only tcp_listen_work. Work items already dispatched onto smc_hs_wq for the CLC handshake continue running unguarded. smc_accept_enqueue() takes a sock_hold() on the child that is never released, so the child smc_sock, its clcsock, and the reference all leak. A remote peer that opens TCP connections while the server calls close() can exhaust kernel memory. Move lock_sock_nested() to before the sk_state check so that the test and the enqueue are atomic under the listener lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74689 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/atm: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in vcc_setsockopt() vcc_setsockopt() contained an ineffective optlen check: if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && optlen != __SO_SIZE(optname)) return -EINVAL; If __SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) evaluated to false (e.g. if the caller passed a mismatched level), the length check optlen != __SO_SIZE(optname) was short-circuited and bypassed. Execution then fell through to switch(optname), calling copy_from_sockptr() assuming optval contained sufficient space. Furthermore, even if level matched, a cgroup BPF setsockopt filter could shrink optlen after entry. Because copy_from_sockptr() on kernel pointers uses memcpy(), this leads to a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read when optlen is smaller than the expected structure size. Fix this by using copy_safe_from_sockptr(), which unconditionally validates that optlen is at least the expected size before copying. Also change the local 'value' variable type from 'unsigned long' to 'int' so that SO_SETCLP matches its sizeof(int) ABI encoding on 64-bit systems. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74688 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: clear control chunk transport if it is being removed sctp_make_heartbeat_ack() caches the destination transport in chunk->transport without taking a reference. When src_out_of_asoc_ok is enabled, the HEARTBEAT ACK may remain queued on control_chunk_list instead of being transmitted immediately. If the peer transport is removed while the chunk is still queued, sctp_assoc_rm_peer() drops the transport and schedules it for RCU freeing, but only clears cached transport pointers in out_chunk_list. The queued control chunk therefore retains a dangling transport pointer. Once an ASCONF_ACK clears the suppression and the queued control chunk is transmitted, SCTP dereferences the stale transport pointer, leading to a use-after-free. Fix this by also clearing chunk->transport for queued control chunks in control_chunk_list when removing the transport. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74678 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: ax88179_178a: fix skb leak in ax88179_tx_fixup() When the interface has NETIF_F_SG enabled and skb_linearize() fails in ax88179_tx_fixup(), the function returns NULL without freeing the skb. usbnet_start_xmit() treats a NULL return from tx_fixup() as a drop (info->flags does not set FLAG_MULTI_PACKET for this driver), jumping to the "drop" label where it does `if (skb) dev_kfree_skb_any(skb)`. Because tx_fixup() returned NULL, the local skb variable in usbnet_start_xmit() is NULL, so the original skb is never freed — a memory leak on every TX frame whose linearization fails (i.e. under memory pressure). Free the skb before returning, matching the error handling already used for the pskb_expand_head() failure path in the same function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74675 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: stabilize tty reference in kbd_keycode with tty_port_tty_get kbd_keycode() reads vc->port.tty without acquiring a tty reference, racing against con_shutdown() which clears port.tty under a different lock. Use tty_port_tty_get()/tty_kref_put() to hold a proper reference for the duration the tty pointer is needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74669 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: clear IPv4 options after rebasing tunnel ICMP errors ip_vs_in_icmp() rebases an skb from the outer ICMP packet to the quoted original request before passing it to icmp_send(). However, IPCB(skb)->opt still describes the outer IPv4 header. A timestamp option in the outer header can therefore leave an offset that points into the quoted transport header after the rebase. __ip_options_echo() treats a byte at that stale location as the option length and copies it into the fixed-size option storage on the __icmp_send() stack, causing a stack out-of-bounds write. Clear the stale option metadata after resetting the network header. Keep the remaining control block fields, including the ingress interface used by the ICMP response path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74668 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len negative. Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb(). The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and header_ops->create is not addressed here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74667 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path packet_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket, any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave skb->mac_header unset here. For frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb->head + (u16)~0, an out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for one consumer in commit f5089008f90c ("macsec: do not read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()"). packet_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb->data points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is anchored on the bypass path too. Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in f5089008f90c. Compile-tested. | ||||