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Search Results (429120 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-77956 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a remote, unauthenticated client to execute arbitrary Elixir code. AshAi.Actions.Prompt evaluates prompt content through EEx.eval_string/2. The documented prompt: fn input, context -> ... end form lets the prompt content be built from action arguments, so when a prompt action's text incorporates request data, that attacker-controlled text is compiled and run as an EEx template (Elixir source). Content such as <%= System.cmd(...) %> therefore executes on the server before any model request is made, requiring no authentication beyond reaching a prompt action. The fix stops evaluating function-supplied prompt content as EEx; only statically configured templates are evaluated. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81315 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor. In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82564 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table. In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"public_ref": {"not_eq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82579 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (Infinite Loop) vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows an attacker who can influence a model's output to hang the tool loop and drive unbounded, repeated model requests. AshAi.ToolLoop classifies a model response of :tool_calls, then filters the calls through normalize_tool_calls/2 and unprocessed_tool_calls/2. Both can empty the list: a call missing a valid name, or one reusing a tool_call_id that already has a result in history, is dropped. With an empty list the loop appended nothing and recursed with a byte-identical message list, so the conversation never advanced and the same request was re-sent every iteration. Under the supported max_iterations: :infinity this never terminated; otherwise it exhausted the full budget. Prompt-injected content can make the model re-emit a spent tool_call_id. The fix treats an empty post-filter list as terminal. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82580 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai discloses internal error text to chat users. In AshAi.ToolLoop and AshAi.Tools, an exception raised while executing a tool was serialized verbatim with Exception.message/1 into the tool-result content. That content is appended to the conversation, emitted as a {:tool_result, ...} stream event, and sent back to the model, which typically relays it to the user. No filtering happened first, so anything raised inside a tool callback or lifecycle hook (database constraint messages, adapter errors, query fragments, policy or validation internals) was echoed as-is. A chat user who can steer tool arguments into a raising code path receives the raw internal text. The fix routes raised tool errors through the same safe formatter used for other tool errors. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75760 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai discloses provider request state and credentials in a user-facing validation error. In AshAi.Changes.Vectorize, when the embedding provider call fails the change added a changeset error whose message inspected the raw error term (An error occurred while generating embeddings: #{inspect(error)}). A plain-string add_error produces an Ash.Error.Changes.InvalidChanges in the :invalid class, which AshJsonApi and AshGraphql render back to the caller. The embedding client's error term is not sanitized, so it can carry the request URL, the provider response body, and, for HTTP clients that keep the request in the error struct, the outbound Authorization header with the provider API key. Failures are attacker-reachable via oversized or malformed vectorized content. The fix logs the raw error and returns a generic message. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75757 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode. AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82722 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node. Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77850 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser. The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82681 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links. The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81852 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection. When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81853 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82673 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server. AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82727 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix writes the entire raw submitted param map into an exception message, so secrets submitted alongside a union form field leak into logs, crash reports and the dev error page. When AshPhoenix.Form.Auto builds a union sub-form and the submitted _union_type does not match a configured type, both raise sites built the message with inspect(params, pretty: true), embedding the full untrusted param map, and also inspected the internal union constraints[:types]. Because the message is constructed by the library rather than Phoenix's parameter logger, config :phoenix, :filter_parameters never redacts it. An attacker controls both the trigger and the contents: submitting %{"_union_type" => "nope", "password" => "..."} puts the password verbatim in the raised message. The fix reports only the offending _union_type and the valid type names, dropping the param and constraints dumps. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 1.2.17 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82726 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header. AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82724 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix invokes the SubdomainHook authorization callback with a nil tenant, so tenant-scoped access checks never see the tenant they are meant to enforce. AshPhoenix.LiveView.SubdomainHook.on_mount/4 attached a handle_params hook to assign the tenant and then immediately called handle_subdomain in the same on_mount. The tenant assign is only written when LiveView later runs handle_params, strictly after on_mount returns, so handle_subdomain read an unset assign and ran as apply(m, f, [socket, nil | a]). A consumer gate that halts when the user does not belong to the tenant instead evaluated nil, either crashing or taking a permissive branch, and it was never re-run once the real subdomain was assigned or on later navigations. The fix runs handle_subdomain inside the handle_params hook with the real tenant on every navigation. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82725 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data. AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77856 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Typescript | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the BEAM atom table and abort the node via client-supplied typed struct field names. resolve_typed_struct_field/2 in lib/ash_typescript/rpc/field_processing/field_selector.ex looks a client-supplied field name up in the typed struct's reverse map and, when it finds no match, falls back to String.to_atom/1. Because this runs before any field-existence check, an unresolvable name mints a permanent atom rather than being rejected as unknown. Atoms are never garbage collected, so a request carrying many distinct names on a typed struct field grows the atom table until the VM aborts at its limit. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77950 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Typescript | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthenticated attacker to receive unredacted internal error data by provoking an error shape the configured error handler does not match. apply_error_handler/3 in lib/ash_typescript/rpc/errors.ex is the only hook an application has for redacting or suppressing errors before they reach the client, with a nil return dropping the error entirely. Its rescue clause logs a warning and then returns the original, pre-handler error map. Error handlers are conventionally written as pattern-matching functions over expected error shapes, so an unmatched shape raises FunctionClauseError and the raw transformed error, including any secrets carried in vars, is emitted instead. An intent to suppress an error becomes an intent to publish it. The rescue catches exceptions only, so a handler that throws or exits still propagates. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.8.0 before 0.18.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82730 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Typescript | 2026-11-19 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthorized RPC caller to read attribute values that Ash field policies denied. When a field policy denies an attribute, Ash substitutes %Ash.ForbiddenField{}, which retains the real value in original_value because embedded resources must remain writable, and hides it from Inspect rather than removing it. AshTypescript.Rpc.ResultProcessor strips these markers to nil on its template-driven paths, but normalize_primitive/1 in lib/ash_typescript/rpc/result_processor.ex had no such clause, so a marker fell through to the generic struct branch which calls Map.from_struct/1 and serializes every key, original_value included. The denied value is returned to the caller inside the marker that represents its own denial. The simplest trigger is an action returning an embedded resource as a map, which routes through normalize_resource_struct/2 with an empty template. normalize_value_for_json/1 is a public, unguarded entry point to the same path. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.0. | ||||