Description
In Trail of Bits fickling through 0.1.12, a pickle STACK_GLOBAL operand carrying a dotted __qualname__ (for example "Values.read_file") is resolved by pickle's find_class through _getattribute to an arbitrary attribute path rather than to a module-level function. Fickling records only the leading component of the name in its import tracking and renders the operation as a plain import (for instance, 'python -m fickling' displays it as 'from optparse import Values.read_file'), so the trailing attribute reference is never analyzed as a call. The OvertlyBadEvals analysis pass does not flag it, and check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings. This allows an attacker to reach a class method that performs code execution: optparse.Values.read_file executes exec(open(filename).read(), vars), achieving arbitrary code execution when the crafted pickle is loaded through fickling.load(), which chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate. optparse is present in all current CPython 3.x releases (deprecated as of Python 3.13, not removed). This weakness is in the resolution and analysis of dotted attribute-path names, and is distinct from and independently fixable from the module-origin trust weakness tracked as CVE-2026-16760: resolving or flagging dotted attribute-path imports closes this vector while leaving the module-level trust behavior unchanged. This bypass was verified to remain present on the vendor master branch at commit d011709 as of 2026-10-30, after the vendor's October blocklist additions and a new heuristic that flags private stdlib attributes; because the public class method Values.read_file is neither blocklisted nor flagged as a private attribute, it is not addressed by those remediations.
Published: 2026-10-30
Score: 8.8 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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History

Sat, 31 Oct 2026 00:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Important


Fri, 30 Oct 2026 23:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Trailofbits
Trailofbits fickling
Vendors & Products Trailofbits
Trailofbits fickling

Fri, 30 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In Trail of Bits fickling through 0.1.12, a pickle STACK_GLOBAL operand carrying a dotted __qualname__ (for example "Values.read_file") is resolved by pickle's find_class through _getattribute to an arbitrary attribute path rather than to a module-level function. Fickling records only the leading component of the name in its import tracking and renders the operation as a plain import (for instance, 'python -m fickling' displays it as 'from optparse import Values.read_file'), so the trailing attribute reference is never analyzed as a call. The OvertlyBadEvals analysis pass does not flag it, and check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings. This allows an attacker to reach a class method that performs code execution: optparse.Values.read_file executes exec(open(filename).read(), vars), achieving arbitrary code execution when the crafted pickle is loaded through fickling.load(), which chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate. optparse is present in all current CPython 3.x releases (deprecated as of Python 3.13, not removed). This weakness is in the resolution and analysis of dotted attribute-path names, and is distinct from and independently fixable from the module-origin trust weakness tracked as CVE-2026-16760: resolving or flagging dotted attribute-path imports closes this vector while leaving the module-level trust behavior unchanged. This bypass was verified to remain present on the vendor master branch at commit d011709 as of 2026-10-30, after the vendor's October blocklist additions and a new heuristic that flags private stdlib attributes; because the public class method Values.read_file is neither blocklisted nor flagged as a private attribute, it is not addressed by those remediations.
Title Fickling check_safety() bypass: dotted __qualname__ in STACK_GLOBAL resolves a class-method attribute path that evades call analysis
Weaknesses CWE-502
CWE-706
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Subscriptions

Trailofbits Fickling
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: BombadilSystems

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-30T21:19:13.015Z

Reserved: 2026-10-29T05:42:00.023Z

Link: CVE-2026-118938

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-30T22:16:54.020

Modified: 2026-10-30T22:16:54.020

Link: CVE-2026-118938

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-10-30T21:19:13Z

Links: CVE-2026-118938 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-30T23:30:15Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-502

    Deserialization of Untrusted Data

  • CWE-706

    Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference